

American White Paper

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The Story of American Diplomacy and the
Second World War

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FOR
J.R.K.
WHO WAS
AMAZINGLY PATIENT

Preface

This is an experiment in contemporary history, and a preface is a form of confessional pleasure necessarily irresistible to the contemporary historian. Dealing with events and individuals in a still-living present, he suffers under certain handicaps. He cannot boldly claim the perspective or the completeness which are the boasts of the historian of a dead past.

Time will inevitably adjust the perspective, illuminate the details, and perhaps alter the meaning of basic facts in our narrative. Meanwhile we can only say that every statement of fact, every descriptive colouration, every quoted word, is the result of as careful and as laborious reporting as we know how to do. For expressions of opinion not attributed to others (which we hope we have made agreeably rare) we are alone responsible. But for all the rest, we have the testimony of every available document and every credible and available source of information.

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RESPONSE TO STIMULI

AT TWENTY MINUTES to three on the morning of September 1, 1939, a buzzer sounded in the White House telephone switchboard. The sleepy night operator plugged in the line. A voice came, "Paris calling," and then another voice, strangely sharp and harsh, "May I speak to the President?" The operators, recognizing the altered Philadelphian tones of William Christian Bullitt, rang Missy LeHand to tell her that the Ambassador to France was unseasonably on the wire. Bullitt is one of the two or three men privileged to speak to the President, without explanation, at any hour of the day or night. "Put him through," said Missy. The operator sounded the bell in the President's bedroom, and the President, who slept the light sleep of anxiety in those days, roused himself quickly and picked up the telephone by his bed.

"Who is it?"

"This is Bill Bullitt, Mr. President."

"Yes, Bill."

"Tony Biddle has just got through from Warsaw, Mr. President. Several German divisions are deep in Polish territory, and the fighting is heavy. Tony said there were reports of bombers over the city. Then he was cut off. He'd tried to get you for half an hour before he called me."

"Well, Bill, it's come at last. God help us all."

There was a few more minutes' talk Bullitt asked the President to try to "fix it so they don't drop any eggs on us," by which he meant requesting the belligerents to refrain from mass bombing of open towns. They both discussed the best means of evacuating Americans stranded in Europe. Then the President broke off, with a simple: "Thank you, Bill, I've got to call Cordell and the others now."

So it was, in a conversation barely rescued by its meaning from downright banality, that the Government of the United States was apprised of the beginning of the Second World War. How the war will end, or when, with what nations victorious, or whether with the landmarks of the world we know forever obliterated, none now can tell. Only one thing is sure; American policy towards the Second World War is the paramount national policy. In the pleasant Georgian chambers of the White House and the high, shabby offices of the be-turreted old State Department, where policy is chiefly shaped, they are thinking of the American future for many years to come.

At the Department the diplomacy of the age of the ant-hill state and the terror from the air unroll somewhat incongruously, in a setting unchanged since the placid days of Chester A. Arthur. In those ornate, tessellated corridors, populated by an ancient race of Negro messengers, Lord Lothian hurrying to discuss the new Armageddon makes no more stir than Lord Sackville dropping in to protest the *Alabama* claims. But in the cable room, the nerve centre of the Department, the instruments chatter ceaselessly, bringing word of the hopes of Chamberlain and Daladier, the intimations of the Wilhelmstrasse and the whispers of

the Kremlin, the latest incidents along the Yang-tse, the latest pressures in the Balkans.

De-coded, mimeographed, stamped "Secret and Confidential," the cables circulate through the Department all day long. First they go to the south corridor of the second floor, to the unpretentious suites of Secretary of State Cordell Hull and his principal lieutenants, tall, glacial, able Under Secretary Sumner Welles and the fertile-minded infant-prodigy-grown-up, Assistant Secretary Adolph Augustus Berle, Jr. Then upstairs, where the hard-working, quietly professional career men, Jay Pierrepont Moffat and James Clement Dunn, preside over the Western European division. And thereafter to lesser offices and the "desks" of countries of origin, English or Spanish, Italian or Scandinavian, where juniors in the service fit each rumour, each event into a minute mosaic of future probabilities. The cables are the stimuli, American policy is the response that these stimuli produce.

The response is sometimes slow, sometimes dramatic, but always continuous. Routine problems are caught up in the well-oiled mechanism of departmental routine. For more portentous matters an old-fashioned conference system prevails, sometimes reaching down to the men on the desks, and almost always including most of the higher officials of the Department. Day after day meetings go on, usually in Hull's big, dark room, where the ghost of the first Hamilton Fish seems to lurk among the heavy furniture. Moffat, learned and cautious, recalls the precedents; Berle boldly constructs a novel theory; Hull brings to bear his homely wisdom, and the matter is thrashed out.

At the White House, meanwhile, the President receives the cables in three daily batches. Most days

also bring him special communications from his ambassadors and ministers—telephone calls, reports confided to returning underlings, or the letters by clipper pouch which Bullitt and several others now prefer to the telephone. Commonly he keeps the day's harvest of information for bed-time reading, lying awake with it, scrawling notes of points to take up on the morrow. But if the meeting in Hull's room is important, he is warned. Then he looks through the relevant papers, summons Hull and Welles to confer, and dictates his opinion in a short "chit" to guide the deliberations at the Department. In the end drafting begins, and the cable instruments chatter again, instructing an American envoy somewhere across the water to "represent to His Excellency in the strongest terms," signify approval, "offer good offices," or darkly hint of penalties to come.

The President, daring, careless of convention, is the entrepreneur. Hull, experienced in practical politics, doggedly obstinate beneath his gently philosophic manner, is the conservative influence. Together they propose, and the Senate, speaking with the voice of American public opinion, in the long run disposes. Yet neither the President, nor Hull, nor the Senate really *makes* American foreign policy.

The cables make it. Senators, who do not read the cables, may be isolationists. But men who see the cables coming in, week by week and month by month, are either enlightened or afflicted with a professional deformation, as you may choose to call it. Those long, mimeographed sheets, with their heavy, secretive stamp, too insistently proclaim this country to be one member only in the community of nations; too grimly suggest that what threatens the community

threatens us. Recent history does not record a President in office or a Secretary of State who believed the United States could safely be indifferent to the fate of the rest of the world.

In these last years, the cables have shown the fate of the rest of the world hanging precariously in the balance. They have told of Japan in China, of Italy in Ethiopia and civil war in Spain, of the arming of the Rhineland, the fall of Vienna, the seizing of the Sudetenlands and the fall of Prague, of the Russo-German pact, and of the tragic climax on the dark early morning of September 1, 1939, when the Second World War began in the stubbly, just-harvested wheat fields of Eastern Poland. To these stimuli, the response has been the American policy of "methods short of war" in aid of the democracies. The object of our history is to describe the formation of that policy, to record its disappointments and successes, and to suggest its tremendous future implications.

Should the war be of long duration, the future will hold many questions. If the democracies exhaust their cash, as they probably will in about two years, will we give or lend them the wherewithal to carry on? Or will we close the American arsenal to them, and run the risk of their defeat? If defeat threatens them for other reasons—the superior German air power, for example—will we change our policy, to assist them in ways no longer "short of war"? Will we send troops, or only the Navy and the Air Force, or nothing at all? And when the war ends, be it long or short, questions will multiply again. If the world is plunged in economic chaos, as now seems inevitable, will we draw on our resources to restore order? If so, on what terms? What do we consider the pre-requisites of world

stability? To achieve it, will we join in political as well as economic settlements? Precisely what kind of post-war world do we want? And why?

To some of the future's questions, one can give the tentative answers of the American policy-makers. They know pretty well, for instance, what kind of post-war world they want; and while they are less certain of the price it is wise to pay, they seem already determined not to send troops abroad, not to join in political settlements, and not to join in settlements of any sort without disarmament and an opening of trade. Within these limits, there remains a vast area of uncertainty, in which a score of variable factors incalculably operate. But even in this area, study of the formation of American policy at least reduces the variables, by revealing the policy-makers' tendencies, modes of thought, and habits of action. And these, maybe, are more worth knowing than any present rules and boundaries by which the policy-makers seek to prescribe events to come.

WHEN THE END OF THE WORLD BEGAN

THE MUNICH CRISIS of 1938, when, as someone remarked, "the end of our world began," was the turning-point in American foreign policy. Before Munich this country's role in world politics was chiefly that of a chorus, somewhat over-given to gloomy gesture and hortatory speech. But from the day late in August, 1938, when the American embassy in Berlin cabled that Adolf Hitler appeared unshakably determined to invade Czechoslovakia, positive and realistic policy-making became unavoidable. For a moment the hope of peace all but ebbed away; and the story of the Munich crisis became the story of the fading of the do-nothing mood among the American policy-makers.

This history will deal chiefly with events in the United States, since only a general knowledge of European developments is necessary to understand the reactions here. But briefly, the situation in late August, 1938, was that Hitler had finally prepared to move towards the climax of the process begun with the re-arming of the Rhineland. After a period of fumbling opposition to the aggressions of the dictatorships, Great Britain had accepted from Neville

Chamberlain the policy of appeasement. France had followed suit, and with both the great European democracies committed to appeasing Hitler, the tenuous structure of collective security survived only in the imagination of optimists.

A little later, the falseness of the appeasers' expectations was to be all too fully proved. Munich was to become only a step in Hitler's aggrandizement. Yet even the appeasement of Munich was not easy, for the French had pledged protection to Czechoslovakia. Thus it was necessary to negotiate a settlement of the Czech question, for if Hitler had attempted to seize parts of Czechoslovakia by force of arms, the French pledge would have become operative. Throughout the Munich crisis, Hitler was on the verge of a brute onslaught against the Czechs, perhaps because, as Sir Nevile Henderson has suggested in his strange memoirs, he wished to come to grips with the democracies while they were still weak. This was the danger that had to be averted. It is no wonder, therefore, that the American policy-makers watched the course of events with extreme disquiet, and that even then there were signs their do-nothing mood would not prove durable.

Although they had to be resisted, temptations to do something were not lacking in the days of Munich. From the start the English and French, frantically trying to satisfy Hitler by peaceable means, frankly longed for our influence to help hold him within bounds. Almost simultaneously with the Berlin embassy's warning, Bullitt and Joseph Patrick Kennedy, our mercurial ambassador in London, reported overtures from officials of the French Foreign Office and from the British Foreign Minister, Lord Halifax.

The overtures, probably concerted in advance, took the form of suggestions of "continuous consultation" during the coming emergency. After careful thought, they were refused. One man summed up, in the worried State Department meetings: "If we start 'continuous consultation' now, we'll find ourselves being treated as an 'associate power' before we know it." Again, on September 13, Bullitt telephoned Hull from Paris, telling him that the Czechs had rejected the ultimatum of the Sudeten German leader, Henlein, that Chamberlain and Daladier were considering a direct three-power conference with Hitler in Berlin at an early date, and that they might like to have "other powers" come in. Hull went off to Woodley, the lovely old house above the city lent to Berle by Henry L. Stimson, there to play croquet and to meditate Bullitt's broad hint between hoops. That evening after supper he talked with the President. The decision was to hold aloof. Throughout the early stages of the crisis, this pattern was repeated.

Caution predominated, imposed both by American public opinion and by a European situation too explosive for Johnny-come-lately interference. The slogan was, "No risks, no commitments." The general sentiment had been well expressed in a memorandum compiled by Berle and submitted to the President on September 1. Berle then urged that we should not "be swung off base by either diplomacy or emotion," and pleaded for the most hard-headed—even cold-hearted—approach to the Czechoslovak question. In fact, Munich was a demonstration of the utmost activity to be expected of policy-makers in a do-nothing mood.

Caution was not quite enough. The crisis mounted.

volunteered to make a draft of the sort of thing the President had in mind.

Berle is the State Department's phrase-maker, as well as one of its most effective officials. He and Moffat turned out a moving document, intended to be addressed by the President "to the American people and all peoples interested." It sensibly proclaimed that "any peace achieved as the result of hostilities will be meaningless." But the temptation to do something had been too strong. The Berle-Moffat draft contained a commitment: "If therefore I am asked by the parties in interest to offer my good offices to help them work out a settlement, I shall accept."

When he has other men draft for him, the President habitually gives them a detailed outline of what he wants, noting the points to be covered, describing the tone to be taken, and specifying the length of the draft. Often he also supplies the key phrase or paragraph. In this case, however, he had been on the telephone to Europe all morning, and he had not had time to discuss their draft in advance with Berle and Moffat. When they finished they brought their handiwork back to the death watch, and a copy was hurried to the President. The mark he desired had not been hit. He immediately excised the offer to enter the European picture if invited. He ordered the tone to be made more formal, and transformed the message into a conventional diplomatic communication urging continued negotiation on the European leaders, arguing for no resort to war. Redrafting began at once, going on all day, now at the Department and now at the White House. At a midnight meeting in his cosy study, the President revised the language of a

final version. Then his tired lieutenants went across to the Department cable room to see the message put on the wires for Europe. Coding was finished and the message was on its way to Paris and London, Prague and Berlin by one o'clock Monday morning.

Hitler replied with a sarrago about Versailles, and by Tuesday, September 27, war seemed as imminent as ever. Early that morning the President and his chief advisers, at a hasty meeting in his sunny bedroom, decided on two final gestures. The President set to work on a personal, confidential message to Mussolini, urging him to increase his pressure for peace. Berle and Welles, hurrying back to their offices, prepared drafts of an answer to Hitler.

The answer to Hitler again raised the question of an American commitment. The first plan was to suggest a peace conference—both Welles and Berle specified a date, September 29, and a place, The Hague Peace Palace. There was talk of promising to send an observer to the conference, and further talk of announcing willingness to join in any economic settlement arranged parallel to the political settlement. But when the two drafts were taken to the White House, Hull firmly deprecated bold measures. The President agreed, and it was decided only to plead for "a meeting at some neutral spot in Europe" to discuss peace terms. Welles was instructed to telephone Bullitt and Kennedy, to ask them to get reactions from Chamberlain and Daladier. In the afternoon Welles' draft, which had been preferred to Berle's, was rewritten until it met with the approval of the who'e State Department group. About supper time Bullitt and Kennedy called back. The French and British Premiers, caught between emergency cabinets

on war mobilization, had been anxiously approving. After early supper Hull and Welles, and a little later Berle, rejoined the President, who had been busy all day with his message to Mussolini.

The upstairs study in the White House is an easy, comfortable room, full of books and prints and family mementoes and fat, chintz-covered furniture. Yet it gave no ease to the four men that night. The President worked at his littered desk, smoking incessantly and shooting questions at the other three. They sat nervously near him, Berle fidgeting, Hull swearing softly under his breath, and Welles for once almost out of countenance. As the President was revising the answer to Hitler, a report came in that the Germans might march in the night, forcing a war to no purpose. For a moment the President showed real anger. But the report was still speculative, and there was no time to lose. Doubtful points were rapidly ironed out; phrases were carefully pruned which might make the two messages anything but direct appeals for peace. By 9 p.m. Hull, who was exhausted, was able to go home. Half an hour later the President had edited and signed both papers. The late summer stars were just beginning to show when Welles and Berle crossed the narrow street dividing the White House from the Department, to go once again to the cable room and watch hopeful words being flashed across the ocean.

Next day, as one now almost nostalgically recalls, the Foreign Office messenger hurried into the House of Commons, interrupting Chamberlain's war speech with Hitler's invitation to the Munich conference. Mussolini's anguished pressure, seconded by the President's appeals, had been effective. The crisis

economic remedy. But like the peoples of the other fat, rich but free nations, our people had been complacent. Condemned to impotence by a public opinion deeply suspicious of foreign adventures, our policy makers had been unable to back up Hull's economic programme with the vast political influence we might have wielded.

Then, during the days of Munich, world peace itself, in which the country's vested interest was so immense, had been immediately threatened by the rise of the new kind of state. In trying to guard this immense interest it had been necessary to excise commitments, refuse joint action, avoid even a promise of further economic co-operation, and speak only in those moralistic and exhortatory terms which are the common currency of American diplomacy. Public opinion still insisted that this was the proper course, but the policy makers were no longer satisfied meekly to accept public opinion's verdict.

They are an oddly diverse group of men. Hull was born in a Tennessee mountain cabin, and, for all his quiet self-containment, is as plain and approachable as an old shoe. Welles wore white gloves as a child at play in the country, and the impressiveness of his mind is still somewhat obscured by his air of suspecting lurking contamination in his surroundings. Berle is the son of a liberal clergyman. Moffat was born in the New York of brownstone conservatism. Bullitt, who has so charmed the French as to serve occasionally as an unofficial cabinet minister, is a romantic, *Childe Harold* sort of fellow. Kennedy is a shrewd ingrainedly bearish stock trader in the skin of a genial stage Irishman. As for the President, in his own person he is variety itself. Yet diverse though they might be,

"The acid test," he said, "is whether anyone is ready to disarm"

It seemed unlikely, considering that the President himself, disturbed by reports of German plane output, had just requested Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson to make alternate plans for stepping up American production to 10,000, 20,000, and 30,000 planes a year. But the President's interest in disarmament was heightened by the fact that he had his own cherished theories on the subject, evolved at the time of his disarmament message to the League of Nations in 1933. His scheme, perhaps over simple, was for gradual elimination of all offensive weapons, such as warplanes and tanks, until only small arms, light cannon, and stationary fortifications should remain. He was fond of saying that if this were done, Germany's 70,000,000 men could be turned back by the 4,000,000 Swiss in the forts on the border. Always optimistic, he even made a small personal gesture of defiance to the forces of the time. He telephoned several of his ambassadors in Europe, to ask what the response would be to specific disarmament proposals. He was told he would be laughed at, and the answer from Berlin was especially emphatic.

Failing to make aggression impracticable, the President still had a plan to make it dangerous. This was a revival of the theory behind his "quarantine" speech at Chicago in 1937. He wanted to define an aggressor as any nation sending troops on to the soil of another, and to obtain a general commitment of absolute non-intercourse with future aggressors. Again he telephoned across the Atlantic, this time only to one or two men. The very first reply, that the small nations were too terrified of Germany and too dis-

gusted by the English sell-out of sanctions against Italy, was flatly convincing. Thereafter he was forced to accept the future in its starkest outline.

THE FOUR GREAT DECISIONS

The future was accepted and prepared for in the course of an event so amorphous that it was difficult to describe exactly, yet so significant that it may almost be called the crux of this history. This was a quiet, unrecorded series of talks after Munich between the President, Hull, and Welles. The talks, during which American foreign relations were thoroughly re-assessed in the light of the Munich experience, began in October and continued through the end of November, 1938. They were neither deliberate nor premeditated; each was a casual and apparently isolated happening.

flannel trimmed and monogrammed with red braid, like an expensive summer horse-blanket. When the discussion grew serious the cape would slip off his pyjamaed shoulder, for he would gesture energetically, waving his cigarette-holder or tapping the cable telling of the approach of world catastrophe.

The talks were long, decisions were slowly reached, because the President, Hull, and Welles found themselves impaled on the ancient dilemma of American policy-makers. The facts of the cables stared in their faces. A terrible struggle was already in progress, confused in detail but clear in outline, between the new states typified by Germany, which were poor but dangerous, and the old states typified by France and England, which were rich but slow. A world war obviously impended, and even our two protecting oceans could not insulate us from its after-effects. At best the war would probably be followed by world-wide economic chaos, with cruel attendant strains on our own economy. At worst the new states would triumph, becoming the dominant world powers, and placing the American democracy in what Berle once described as "the unfortunate position of an old-fashioned general store in a town full of hard-bitten chains." To the President, Hull, and Welles our interest seemed clear. We must prevent war if possible, and if war proved inevitable, we must do our best to assure victory for the other democracies.

There was no doubt about what to do; the question was how to do it. We had the power to do anything. Great enough, rich enough, strong enough, we might actually substitute a Pax Americana for the seemingly crumbling Pax Britannica under which we and the world had known reasonable comfort for so long.

their basic dilemmas the President, Hull, and Welles agreed that here, too, their policy must be positive. Any commitment which might take this country to war was obviously out of the question. The people and the President were at one on this. War is almost the only subject which dampens his customary light-heartedness, and he was preternaturally solemn when he told the others on two or three occasions: "While I am in the White House I never expect to see American troops sent abroad."

But there were also "methods short of war"—a phrase coined by the President during this period. If war came, the President did expect to use methods short of war in aid of the democracies. He foresaw the change in the minds of the people, and was sure that his policy would be supported in the end. Meanwhile Hugh Wilson was cabling from Berlin that Hitler and his advisers were equally confident the American people would not change their minds. War might just possibly be prevented if Hitler could be convinced he was mistaken. Unhappily there was no convincing evidence available; the change in the minds of the people was still in the future. Pondering the problem, discussing their methods short of war, the President, Hull, and Welles hit upon an ingenious, if somewhat optimistic solution. Big talk being an established tradition of American diplomacy, they would treat Hitler to a sort of psychological peace offensive. They would "speak sharply to the little boy and beat him when he sneezes" (the President has a family weakness for quotations from *Alice*) until he learned to count this country's weight in the scale against him.

Despite his certainty that his big talk would not end

by being empty, the President faced his task with some exasperation. Again and again, he told Hull and Welles that the German leadership was "as usual" miscalculating present policy and future opinion here. Again and again he doubtfully recalled the German errors in 1914-1917, and hoped it was "not too late to get it through Hitler's head" that the peace offensive reflected what would come. He knew the hope was pretty faint.

The peace offensive was decided on early. A more vital second decision was reached late in November. Do-nothingism had produced the Neutrality Act, and in the Neutrality Act was embedded the arms embargo, withholding essential aid from the democracies in time of war. The embargo was an important point in Hitler's strategy. Its mere existence negated the policy of methods short of war. Without a move to repeal it, the peace offensive would be whistling in the wind. Aware that the time was politically unripe the President and the other two discussed the problem prayerfully and at length. Finally they agreed they must attempt repeal of the embargo in the next session of Congress.

Simultaneously came the third decision. During the Munich crisis and for some time thereafter, economic commitments and political commitments had been lumped together as equally impossible. Now, however, the President and Hull and Welles laid down a new and far-reaching principle of American diplomacy. Europe's politics, they said, are not our business until they reach the stage of threatened world war; making long-term political commitments in Europe was Wilson's great error. But Europe's economics, since Europe is a vital segment of the world economy, are

very much our business ; European economic commitments, they told one another, may justly be made. On this principle the President acted rather daringly. He was still hoping for a general settlement accompanied by substantial disarmament. He thought a general settlement might be made more tempting if it were known the United States would support its economic aspects. In another series of transatlantic telephone calls he instructed his ambassadors in Europe to wave the economic bait beneath the proper noses.

"If we can only make them believe in our sincerity," he told Hull and Welles ruefully, "we may see a return to a common-sense world."

The times were not propitious for returns to common-sense, but the crucial talks after Munich are even now bearing fruit. The drive for hemispheric unity has produced the common war-time front of the Americas. The peace offensive, destined though it was to failure, became the forerunner of present policy towards the war. And if the great distinction between economic and political commitments proved of little use in preserving peace, it may still find its important application when the war is over

ERSATZ WAS NOT ENOUGH

ONLY THE AVERAGE citizen's gigantic lack of interest in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere explains the fact that the curious, entertaining, and singularly important story of the Pan-American conference at Lima remains, to this day, a never told tale.

Its hero was Cordell Hull, who sailed from New York for the Peruvian capital early in December, 1938, as the head of the American delegation to the conference. The delegation was decidedly miscellaneous, including Adolph Berle, a strayed political fat cat, Alf Landon, whom the President had pressed to serve as a symbol of the non-partisanship of his foreign policy, and John Lewis' daughter Katherine, through whom the President was vainly trying a little appeasement of his own. The delegation's aims, however, were sufficiently precise. In their talks after Munich, the President, Hull, and Sumner Welles had planned to shape the two Americas into a common front, to make them an island of peace and trade in a sorely troubled world. At Lima they wished to lay the groundwork, in a declaration by all the American nations that they would unite to protect their hemispheric solidarity.

The tale did not lack for villains. The Germans and their allies, the Italians, were carrying on an extensive programme of economic and political pene-

tration in South America. Their propaganda was incessant, and there were reports of crude German pressure on prospective Lima conferees. Meanwhile the British, still blindly running on the appeasing tack, were inclined to use their not inconsiderable influence to back Germany up. As Berle remarked to Hull in one of their long heart-to-hearts on the sea voyage, this was "the first Pan-American conference to feel the impact of European diplomacy."

Fortunately the impact of European diplomacy was not likely to disconcert a man who had seen the nomination of Alton Parker, watched Woodrow Wilson down Champ Clark, fought through the long stalemate between Smith and McAdoo, and helped round up the South for Roosevelt in 1932. A Pan-American conference, after all, is a far less frantic and complex affair than a doubtful Democratic convention. On reaching Lima, Hull calmly set out, rather in the manner of a candidate's campaign manager making contact with the bosses, on his customary round of visits to the heads of other national delegations. Undisturbed by the odd ornateness of Limean hotel rooms or the unfamiliarity of Latin-American statesmen, he knowingly peddled his plan with Berle's help. Before long he had lined up nineteen other delegations, and was having difficulty restraining the Brazilians and Colombians, who boldly proposed something in the nature of a hemispheric league of nations. Uruguay was uncertain, but as usual Argentina, where British influence and isolationist sentiment are both strong, was the only serious hold-out.

The Argentine Foreign Minister, wily, touchy José María Cantillo, had led his delegation to the conference. He arrived with something of a flourish, loudly

proclaiming that the conference should limit itself strictly to intra-American affairs, but admitting that as a special concession he would accept a weak declaration of solidarity with no provision to enforce it. Simultaneously he announced that his health required him to leave for an immediate holiday on the Chilean lakes, where he would be completely incommunicado. Could the problem, he politely demanded, be settled without delay? Hull refused to be rushed, whereat Cantillo duly departed, leaving the Argentine delegation headless and technically unable to act.

There followed a typical incident of Latin-American diplomacy. The patient Hull, wisely rejecting the seeming diplomatic triumph of an enormous majority for his plan, sat down to wait for unanimity. Cantillo, enjoying his holiday, was sedulously out of touch with his own delegates, but secretly maintained an informal contact with the Chilean Foreign Office. The conference and newspapers seethed with talk of the clumsily obvious tactics of the German agents at Lima. Hull and Berle found a moment's diversion in inducing Miss Lewis to refrain from addressing gatherings of Peruvian revolutionary workers. The official dinners went on and on, in an ecstasy of rich food and richer oratory. Meanwhile the Chileans were reporting the true state of affairs to Cantillo. They made it plain that Hull was not going to wait forever.

Musing among the baroque theatricalities of an Andean watering-place, Cantillo saw that his isolation, while splendid, was rather too complete. He thereupon telegraphed a new formula for a conference resolution to his Chilean friends, with instructions to show it to no one. The Chileans, correctly inter-

preting the instructions as meaning the formula should be shown no one but Hull, transmitted it to him without delay. Hull, seeing that Cantillo's formula closely approximated his own, cheerfully circulated it as Argentine in origin. Thus Cantillo won his laurels. After interminable revisions to meet the wishes of other delegations, the new formula was approved by a unanimous vote. Officially christened "the Declaration of Lima" by Berle, it ran in part:

"The eighth international conference of American states declare . . . that they reaffirm their decision to maintain and defend (their continental solidarity) against all foreign intervention and activity . . . by the procedure of consultation . . . when deemed advisable and at the initiative of any one of them."

The language was dull enough, but the Declaration's far-reaching effect was to make all American nations joint guarantors of the formerly one-sided Monroe Doctrine. On the strength of the Declaration, the President and Welles prepared to use the vast resources of the United States to finance closer economic ties with South America. Later the Declaration was the basis for the call to the war-time Panama conference, at which active diplomatic co-operation was achieved by the American nations. Hull had won, and if the present programme is wisely prosecuted, his victory will become a significant date in the development of an entirely new hemispheric relationship.

SENATORS WERE SHOCKED

The story of Lima, unfortunately, only points the contrast between the decisions of the talks after Munich in the two fields of hemispheric and European affairs.

Public opinion, though uncomprehending, permitted a positive policy in the Western Hemisphere. In the European field, our positiveness was necessarily ersatz. The peace offensive—the effort to cow Hitler into peacefulness on which the President, Hull, and Welles had also decided in their talks after Munich—was strictly an ersatz policy, in which every move had to be carefully calculated for maximum effect in Germany and minimum effect in the still isolationist United States. Furthermore, it was founded on a double anticipation, of a change in opinion here, and of a change in Europe, where English and French appeasement leaders like Bonnet and Chamberlain privately resented it as placing them in a pusillanimous light before their followers. Frankly as a forlorn hope, then, the peace offensive had been launched while the talks after Munich were still in progress.

The peace offensive's most important moves took place in private. In Berlin Hugh Wilson was instructed to seize upon every informal opportunity to instil in the mind of the Wilhelmstrasse the thought that further German aggression would cause the gravest repercussions in the United States. Bullitt in Paris, Kennedy in London, and other American envoys in other capitals were always ready with the same opinion for any German ear. In Washington, State Department officials repeatedly warned members of the German embassy staff against miscalculating this country's future course. Thus, without any formal steps being taken, the Wilhelmstrasse was constantly worked upon to accept the desired view. Unfortunately, however, the Wilhelmstrasse had been worked upon before, though in less concerted fashion, notably by Bullitt and Wilson. There had been no visible result.

Therefore, to make the private warnings more effective, there were also public demonstrations, of which two incidents will serve as typical.

Early in November the young Jew, Herschel Grinszpan, murdered an attaché of the German embassy in Paris. Frightful pogroms promptly broke out all over the Reich. American opinion recoiled in horror at the news from Berlin, and the President saw his chance. In the State Department meetings a strong faction favoured a mere written expression of disapproval to Hitler. They were overruled by the President in a long final discussion at the White House, and on November 13 a cable of recall was sent to Hugh Wilson in Berlin. Next day Hull announced that "the Ambassador to Germany was coming home to report and confer," but it was made clear that Wilson's recall was intended as the sharpest possible rebuke to Hitler. And on November 15, just to make matters entirely clear, the President followed up with a statement :

"The news of the past few days from Germany has deeply shocked public opinion in the United States. Such news from any part of the world would inevitably produce a similar profound reaction among American people in every part of the nation.

"I myself could scarcely believe that such things could occur in a twentieth-century civilization.

"With a view to gaining a first-hand picture of the situation in Germany I asked the Secretary of State to order our Ambassador in Berlin to return at once for report and consultation."

There is controversy as to whether the rebuke was worth depriving our Berlin mission of its head ; at any rate, it was taken as meant. Hitler countered by

recalling his Ambassador in Washington, Hans Dieckhoff, leaving the relations between the two countries in the hands of *chargés d'affaires*, the German here, tall, suave, Norwegian-born Hans Thomsen, and the American in Berlin, Alexander Kirk, whose elaborate manners and weakness for *bric-à-brac* conceal a formidably shrewd mind. Wilson arrived in New York the day Hull sailed for Lima, and Hull's ship was delayed two hours to allow Wilson to report in person. He is an orderly, unemotional fellow. In the stuffy sitting-room of Hull's suite, he described with dry precision the brutish persecution of the Jews, the fat graft taken by the Nazi leaders and their understrappers, and the disgust among the decent rank and file of Germans. Admitting this disgust had briefly strengthened the Nazi moderates, Wilson predicted the counsellors of violence would prevail in the end. Hull, like the President later, heard the report with a heavy heart.

Then midway through December, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes made one of his blistering anti-Nazi speeches. The Wilhelmstrasse, on receiving the text, instructed Hans Thomsen to protest. The President and Welles had foreseen something of the sort, and when the unlucky German *chargé* arrived at the Department, Welles was ready for him. He had barely completed his errand when Welles let go in his most severe and icy style. "Protest emphatically rejected—In many decades the public opinion of the United States has not been so shocked and confounded as by recent events in Germany—Considering the language of the controlled German Press towards American statesmen, this would seem to come with a singularly ill grace—I can see no propriety——" At

best the Wellesian demeanor is on the chilly side, but this demonstration of what Welles could do when he tried would have frozen the marrow of an Arctic whale. Welles thoroughly enjoyed it, and so did the President at second hand. Thomsen and the Wilhelmstrasse did not.

It must be remembered, however, that the purpose of these incidents and the numerous lesser ones of the same sort was not to exhibit indignation for the pure moral pleasure of so doing. The purpose was to convince Hitler, Ribbentrop, and the rest that if American opinion would support such violent affronts to Germany at this time, something much worse was to be expected later. By hindsight it seems rather like singing songs to a tiger, but then the President hoped that immediate repeal of the arms embargo would give substance to his big talk. It was with the double intention of seeking repeal and hastening the change in American opinion that he set about preparing his annual message "on the state of the union" to the incoming Congress.

The vital decisions of the talks after Munich were already a month old in those late December days when the President went to work. Christmas, with its family parties, was just over, and the New Year of 1939, when the President would give his annual midnight toast, "the United States of America," was just at hand.

This busiest time of the President's year always strangely invigorates him. He was cheerful yet serious, for he intended to make his message the first full exposition of his theory of foreign relations. Thrashing things out with Hull and Welles, he had thoroughly made up his mind; he knew just what he wished to say. As he does when he is not over-pressed, he wrote

the message himself. Sitting late at the desk in his study, while children, grandchildren, and guests watched the after-supper movies in the hall outside, he dictated and re-dictated to his admirable stenographer, Grace Tully. While she typed drafts he would scribble notes in his rapid, slanting, pointed hand, or talk with Welles, who had previously submitted the usual preliminary departmental outline of the message. The task took more than one night, but the result seemed worth it to the President and Welles. Standing before the joint Congressional session on January 3, the President read the message with unusual expressiveness:

"Words may be futile, but war is not the only means of commanding a decent respect for the opinions of mankind. There are many methods short of war, but stronger and more effective than mere words, of bringing home to aggressor governments the sentiments of our people. At the very least, we can and should avoid any action, or any lack of action, which will encourage or assist an aggressor. We have learned that when we deliberately try to legislate neutrality, our neutrality laws may operate unevenly and unfairly—may actually give aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim. The instinct of self-preservation should warn us that we ought not to let that happen any more."

Having said so much, the President had done all he could to meet the situation as he saw it. A few days later Hull, just back from Lima, conferred with Key Pittman, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Sol Bloom, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Pittman assured Hull that if neutrality revision were only left in his hands, it

would be accomplished in time. Hull, who has an intelligent bias against interference with the legislative branch, assented to this arrangement. And so Hull and the President settled themselves to wait.

It was not easy waiting, that winter. England and France were rearming frenziedly, and every month brought its signs of trouble ahead. In January, Lord Lothian, now the British Ambassador in Washington, visited this country and saw the President, telling him with all the authority of a former leading appeaser that appeasement was becoming a dead policy. And there was a rumbling, underground alarm of war, when Germany attempted to extract from Belgium a promise of neutrality in the event of an attack on Holland. For a fortnight it seemed as though German diplomacy would attain its end; Holland would then have been isolated from aid except by sea, and a blitzkrieg against the Netherlands was momentarily expected. Then the fear passed, but with February came new fears, until there seemed to be no end ahead. In this atmosphere the President ventured an exact prediction to Charles Edison, his deaf, mild-mannered, biddable Secretary of the Navy.

"Charley," he said to Edison during one of their frequent general talks, "I have it in mind we won't get through the summer without seeing the world in a hell of a mess. We're doing everything we can to prevent it, but after all, we're only playing the off-chance."

"When exactly, do you think it will come, sir?" Edison asked.

"My hunch is the end of June or the beginning of July," replied the President.

The literal-minded Edison returned to his office and

put a red mark on his calendar at the third week in June. Others, unfortunately, were not so ready to take the President at his word. Reading the cables, firmly believing that if the peace offensive could only be capped by repeal of the arms embargo the chance of war would be reduced by half, the President and Hull and Welles had lost touch a little with domestic opinion. For them the European situation was an immediate reality which cried out to be dealt with. To others, who did not read the cables, the incidents of the peace offensive only suggested that the President was war-minded, unneutral in the legal sense, and even perhaps guilty of ponderable improprieties. These suspicions, whose public expression constantly negated the peace offensive, came violently to a head in the queer incident of the French air mission.

The story of the French air mission is another which has never been correctly told. It goes back to a War Department competition for an attack bomber, announced by Secretary of War Harry Woodring in December, 1937, and set to end in March, 1939. In the spring of 1938, Glenn Martin, L. D. Bell of Bell Aircraft, J. H. Kindelberger of North American Aviation, and an official of the Gurtiss-Wright Company went to Germany, at the request of the President, to find out the truth about German aviation. In the unpleasant dossier they brought back were the characteristics of the Heinkel bomber. The Heinkel, already in production, was far better than the specifications for the American bomber of the Woodring competition, and the competition deadline was a year distant. So little love is wasted between Woodring and Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson that they barely give one another the time of day. Johnson,

acting on his own, promptly reversed former procurement procedure and obtained new designs greatly superior to the Heinkel. Meanwhile, for all Woodring knew, the bombers built for his competition were the best the army had on order.

Into this situation, in December, William Christian Bullitt injected a French mission bent on buying American planes. With great brilliance and remarkable far-sightedness, Bullitt mixes a failing for Oppenheimism. He kept the Frenchmen elaborately under cover, and persuaded the President to make Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., their liaison with the government. The French wanted bombers of the Woodring competition design. Woodring still wrongly believed these planes were the army's best. When at last he learned of the presence of the mission, he accused Morgenthau of trying to give military secrets to the French. There followed a ridiculous but bitter game of Box and Cox, which was only terminated when the President, advised by Louis Johnson, ordered the army to release to the French the superseded Woodring competition bombers and the Curtiss P36 pursuit ships which subsequently did so well against the German Messerschmitts. Then in February a French flyer crashed on the coast, and all the bitterness boiled over in an investigation by the Senate Military Affairs Committee. The President, disquieted by the committee's obvious feelings towards himself, invited the Senators to the White House for a talk.

Occurring in a lull in the rising storm, the Senate committee's visit to the White House oddly summed up the fundamental misunderstandings in the matter of foreign policy. Among the men who trooped into the

President's office some were friendly, like kindly, courtly old Morris Sheppard of Texas and the serious-minded Republican, Warren Austin of Vermont. Others, like the homespun foot-swallower Ernest Lundeen of Minnesota, able Bennett Champ Clark of Missouri, and the professional peace man, Gerald Nye of North Dakota, were decidedly hostile. All were pre-occupied with domestic problems, and while their complaint against the President was that he had been un-neutral, the great majority were strangely convinced that there would be no war. This theory had been lovingly spread by the isolationists, who simultaneously argued that the English and French were wicked imperialists and bound to give in to Hitler anyway.

The President, too vividly remembering the cables, badly misjudged his audience. He began by painting the dark picture of Europe, describing the German ambitions in the most lively terms, stating that Hitler would not be thwarted, warning that war was imminent. War, he said, gesturing towards the listening Senators, would directly affect "the peace and safety of the United States." The immediate struggle," he went on, "was for the domination of Europe, but so soon as one nation dominates Europe, the nation will be able to turn to the world sphere."

Without noticing the Senators' growing uneasiness, he listed all the various permutations and combinations by which war might come, naming the small nations which might be engulfed—Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the Scandinavian countries, Poland, and what then remained of Czechoslovakia, Holland, Belgium, and the countries of the upper Balkans.

Finally, turning westward, he reminded the Senators that England, France, and Holland had colonies reaching round the world, and that if their possessions should ever fall into German hands, there would be no knowing where the struggle would end. He described it, essentially, as a struggle between different kinds of economies, a world revolution in which this country, though fortunate in its protecting oceans, was still a have-nation endangered by the assault of the have nots. Then he added:

"That is why the safety of the Rhine frontier does necessarily interest us."

"Do you mean that our frontier is on the Rhine?" asked one of the Senators, breaking the listening silence.

"No, not that. But practically speaking if the Rhine frontiers are threatened the rest of the world is too. Once they have fallen before Hitler, the German sphere of action will be unlimited."

Such talk was strong meat even for internationalists. To the Senators, hugging the comfortable thought that there would be no war, it seemed extreme alarmism, in itself alarming because so highly coloured. The isolationists, sharply disagreeing with the fundamental reasoning, were downright outraged. Being outraged, they said so, and in the end the report appeared that the President had said what he had not, that the Rhine frontiers were our frontiers. Suspicion of him grew still stronger, repeal of the arms embargo was further deferred, and the ersatz quality of the peace offensive was fully revealed. The acid irony of the situation was that just the opposite would have happened if the Senators and the public could only have been made to believe what the President and the State Department

knew to be so Yet by March 10 the President's forecasts were already beginning to be proved correct.

PRAGUE AND APPEASEMENT FALL

That day the cables made a curious pattern. At Belgrade the Yugoslavian Foreign Minister described the Munich settlement as a "triumph of peace." In Paris Bullitt, sometimes over-sensitive, was vibrant with concern over a new rumour of invasion of Holland and Switzerland. In London the Prime Minister treated a select group of newspapermen to an amazing background lecture, reiterating his prediction of "peace in my time" and painting all Europe with a thick, unconvincing wash of *couleur de rose*. And in Prague American Minister Wilbur Carr cabled that the Czech central government had just dismissed all but two members of the Slovakian cabinet for separatism and for promoting intrigue with Berlin.

Carr's d'spatch, couched in the old career man's painfully professional style, was the least exciting in the bundle brought over for the President's evening reading, but in two days Berlin cables indicated Hitler's support of the Slovakian separatists. Three days later, at 3 55 a.m. of March 15, Czech President Hacha was in the Reichschancellery, surrendering to Hitler's prolonged third degree, and at 6 a.m. the German army advanced into Bohemia. Carr telephoned Bullitt in Paris, and the President's sleep was broken by Bullitt's transatlantic call announcing the invasion. By breakfast-time he had Carr's cable telling of the arrival of the German troops in Prague, of General Von Goblentz taking over the Presidential palace, and of the street crowds, silent, or weeping, or

desperately daring to jeer. Always complete, Carr added that the "occupation was accomplished in snowy weather."

The President and Welles, discussing the cables together, were filled with the outrage felt by most men in those days. Welles, shuttling back and forth between the Department and the White House, called the seizure of Prague "the first unshaded instance of open thievery," and rounded out the magnificently typical phrase by confessing to the President that it made him almost sick to be unable to give public vent to his feelings. Hull, resting in the South, heard the news by telephone from the President and, hearing it, was moved to use all his transcendent talent for picturesque profanity.

Searching for weapons to implement the peace offensive, the President had meanwhile laid hands on the economic powers so casually granted by Congress and so often turned to unforeseen account in New Deal foreign policy. There was some evidence of the dumping of German goods in this country. Hastily conferring between cables and telephone calls the President and Welles decided to use the evidence as a basis for application of counter-vailing duties against Germany. They also decided on immediate abrogation of the trade agreement with Czechoslovakia, and since they did not wish the loot of Prague to be so rich as the loot of Vienna, they planned to try to freeze Czech balances in American banks. All three steps were immediately arranged with the Treasury and the Justice Department. The freezing of the Czech balances was most difficult, but Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., telephoned George Harrison, Governor of the New York Federal Reserve

Bank, to ask him to bring the New York banks into line. Then Welles called in Thomsen and told him what was afoot. Dumping, not Prague, was Welles' chief theme; yet Thomsen, knowing counter-vailing duties amounted to an embargo against his country's exports, glumly saw the menace which existed.

In these actions there was something of the automatic reflex, as in the statement denouncing the "wanton lawlessness" of Hitler's actions which Welles prepared that evening after long consultation with the President and several calls to Hull. Had the Senate acted immediately on the arms embargo, something might have been gained. But Hitler and the Wilhelmstrasse were well aware of the principle of American foreign relations so well expressed by Jules Henri, long counsellor of the French embassy in Washington, who used to say that he wired his foreign office once a month, "*Le Président propose, le Sénat dispose.*" Mere gestures by the President and State Department were of little value in a situation rapidly assuming the aspect of a war crisis.

In England and France, Prague and appeasement had fallen together. By March 18, when Welles' statement was made public, Kennedy was cabling that one of the most influential appeasers now believed England must fight, and Bullitt's despatches described French officials wailing that diplomacy had ceased to exist, and that war was approaching at a terrible speed. Two days later Litvinov informed the American embassy in Moscow that he had been queried by the British on the Soviet attitude in the event of a German attack on Rumania, and news of the first moves in the attempted encirclement of Germany came from Poland and the Balkans.

It was in this atmosphere, with the cables bringing cries of anguish and alarm from every capital in Europe, that the President, Hull, and Welles formulated another new and important principle of American foreign policy. Hull had come hurrying home, and the trio had resumed their habit of constant general discussion. With war more imminent than ever, they began to think of other aspects of American war-time policy besides aiding the democracies by "methods short of war." Knowing the fearful havoc war might bring, realizing its probable effect on the American economy, they evolved the principle which Welles admirably expressed in the remark that "neutrals are parties at interest in a modern war, and particularly in the post-war settlement." This principle, giving neutrals a prescriptive right to a seat at the conference table, is only now becoming the basis for tentative efforts to form a united neutral front for "common sense," as the President calls it.

In those days, however, the principle was just tossed out, as it were, in the teeth of the whirlwind. By April 5 the Italian army was mobilizing for the invasion of Albania and the little country was overrun on April 7. Hull issued a condemnatory statement as news arrived of mobilization in Germany. Both London and Paris feared that Hitler might attempt a preventive war while the democracies were still ill-prepared, and Berlin cables of April 10 seemed to confirm these expectations, telling of large German forces starting for the Polish frontier. On April 11 the Italian military classes of 1910 and 1914 were called to the colours, and seven German divisions were menacing Poland. Bullitt cabled that the highest French officials put the chances of war at ten to one,

and quoted a sadly pointed sentence : " It's just five minutes before midnight ; the darkest hour is at hand."

Probably a quarter century must elapse before we know whether the European foreign offices were correct in fearing war last April. On April 8, just after Hull had made his statement on the invasion of Albania, there was a meeting at the White House. And at the meeting was conceived the final masterpiece of the ersatz which deferred war, if war was indeed deferred.

As usual the President had been on the transatlantic telephone, calling his ambassadors to ask if there was anything he could do. As usual the answers had been coming back : " Not without making some commitment." And as always public opinion put commitments out of the question. But the President told the others in his office that he had a plan which required no commitment, yet held out some hope of ending the crisis. As he outlined it, he would address personal messages to Hitler and Mussolini. Taking their peaceful professions at face value, he would plead with them to promise specifically not to attack other nations. To increase the dramatic effect, he would even name the nations to be guaranteed against aggression. Hull and Welles immediately saw the merits of the plan. At worst, by asking the dictators point-blank whether they would fish or cut bait, it ought to provide a breathing space in which England and France could continue to rearm. At best, it might give England and France time to make encirclement effective. It was simple yet ingenious, easy, and harmless.

Awaiting the psychological moment the President had time to spare. Throughout the evening of April 8

and again on the evening of April 9, he dictated and re-dictated to Grace Tully drafts of the proposed message. On April 10 he was very busy; he could not correct his final version until the late afternoon, when he finally sent it to the State Department. Welles, Berle, Feis, Moffat, and Dunn gathered in the Secretary's office, to listen eagerly to Hull, who read the document aloud, lisping a little, dropping his r's as always. The President's language was plain, even rather homely in spots—he referred to “our next-door neighbour, Canada”—but the argument was *cogent*. Describing the danger of war, stating that there could be no negotiation while aggression threatened, he asked for guarantees of safety for “Finland, Esthonia, Latvia, Lithuania,” and so on down to “the Arabias, Palestine, Egypt, and Persia.” As Hull went through the list, the others could imagine the President calling off the countries from a map while Grace Tully scribbled unceasingly. Then came a prediction that other nations would gladly offer similar guarantees, and the inevitable closing suggestion that such questions as disarmament and an opening of trade might profitably be discussed thereafter.

In the next days the labour of re-drafting slowly progressed. Adolph Berle did the initial work. Having a surprising theory that a semi-diplomatic communication might influence the peoples against their masters, he made one of his drafts an eloquent address to the citizens of Italy and Germany. Then the President took Berle's handiwork and made new drafts, restoring his original plan, saving the best of Berle's purple passages, removing the strongest touches, and adding touches of his own. In the course of his argument for peaceful negotiation, he found an illustration which

delighted him—"In the pioneer days of America, courts of justice followed the frontiersmen, but it was a well-established rule that all arms were left outside the court-room." Hull and Welles had some difficulty convincing him that Hitler and Mussolini would scarcely understand a request to "park your guns outside."

By April 13 the message was complete. Hull, Welles, Berle, and Norman Davis, whose advice Hull had sought, had all made their contributions, but the main substance was the President's own, and he was pleased with it. The next afternoon Hull and Welles brought over the midday cables to the President's office. The three men read them anxiously together. The news was very dark, for the warnings of war to come had risen in a wild crescendo of anxiety. The President telephoned Bullitt, who feared the worst. Hull still doubted whether the time was ripe to send the message, but the President said he had one of his lunches.

"We only just caught the boat before Munich," he said. "Perhaps they're too worried in Europe, but I don't want to miss the boat now."

Accordingly the message was put on the wires for Rome and Berlin, where it had the effect of a sudden explosion. Berle was certainly miscalculating when he supervised elaborate undercover arrangements for radio publicity, by which translations of the message and favourable comment were broadcast into Germany and Italy. If anything, the German and Italian peoples were angered by the intervention from abroad. Perhaps the President was miscalculating, too, for there is some reason to believe he had a lingering hope that his masterpiece of ersatz would have permanent results. But if the results were not permanent, they were

satisfactory. Hitler and Mussolini were brought up all standing. There was a sudden pause, and the cables, speaking no more of war, were full of speculations on the dictators' answers to the President. Mussolini's came first, an infuriated single sentence in a speech. Hitler's, delayed until the end of April, was a long oration to the Reichstag attacking the President in such a way that it was thought to have been prepared for American consumption in the German embassy here. Then, after the answers had been given, there was no more crisis, and the business of drumming up emotion had to begin all over again.

So ended this curious and little-understood incident. It had a more curious postlude. The President called in the Italian Ambassador, Prince Colonna, and told him genially but firmly that Mussolini had been guilty of a breach of good manners in failing to make a written reply to a written communication. The same intimation was conveyed to Thomsen by the State Department. Unfortunately, however, polite deportment was not a preoccupation of the dictatorships.

DEATH OF HOPE

HISTORICAL SPECULATION is the idlest of pastimes. Yet it is irresistible to speculate on what might have happened if the President had dared, some time before the fall of Prague, to present the issues of American foreign policy squarely to the people. If he had bluntly warned them of the approach of war ; if he had told them that here and here our vital interests were involved ; if he had urged them to join him in protecting those interests ; if he had loudly cried havoc in the market-place—but the fact is he did not.

The fact is that from the Munich crisis through the spring of 1939, American policy was ingenious rather than forthright. It was ersatz ; the best substitute the President could improvise for the more positive policy he was debarred from following. Even in his January message to Congress, when he asked repeal of the arms embargo and spoke of his " methods short of war " in aid of the democracies, he dealt largely in intimations. Probably he was wise in refusing to precipitate a great national debate, yet in that chancy time after the April crisis he had to pay a heavy penalty. Appeasement was over. England and France were reaching out for allies against Germany, to Poland, Turkey, Rumania, and Russia. The moment was

propitious for assertion of America's influence in the cause of peace. Repeal of the arms embargo might have tipped the balance. And the failure to debate the central issues had caught the repeal movement in a deadly inertia.

At the New Year, following conferences between Cordell Hull and the legislative leaders, the Congressional management of repeal had been confided to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Key Pittman. Pittman had been in the Alaska gold rush before settling in his Nevada bailiwick, and he still approached foreign relations with something of the spirit of the old frontiersmen who shouted "Fifty-four forty or fight." A clever man, a good talker, a recognized oligarch of the Senate, he had the will and the experience for his task. Unhappily he also had a strain of weakness in him somewhere. Opportunities slipped through his fingers. Delays were endless. Every fortnight or so from January to April, the President or Hull asked him for a report. He always replied that this or that obstacle remained to be surmounted, but that the prospects were very fair.

"Two weeks more and we'll be getting somewhere," he used to say.

By mid-April, reading the cables, expecting the final denouement in Europe, the President and Hull were weary of this fortnightly experience of hope deferred. The two men had a long, serious talk. The President, still somewhat suspicious of the British and French appersers, was doubtful of the proper course. Hull was more sure. Fearing war even more than the President, even more convinced that repeal of the embargo would increase the chance of peace, Hull

urged fighting for repeal as a matter of principle. After a careful thought the President agreed, and Hull saw Pittman again. This time, at last, Pittman confessed that the prospects were far from fair. Thereupon the President and Hull took the fight into their own hands, beginning a series of conferences with wavering Senators and Congressmen. They discussed what to say in advance, and each supplemented the other.

The President saw the men assigned to him in the late afternoons, when his work was done and the warm spring dusk was veiling the White House garden outside his office windows. His topics were the situation's political aspects, the likelihood of war, and war's meaning to this country if the dictatorships should be victorious. He spoke calmly, often half humorously, but what he said was neither soothing nor funny, for he carried his speculations to a strong conclusion. Pointing out that the British in defeat could not remain masters of the sea, he predicted dominant sea-power as the first objective of the victors. Underlining the threat of new navies in the Atlantic, he recalled the difficulties of our own South American relations, and the ease with which the dictatorships, hungry for raw materials, could use South America's products. To the by now goggle-eyed law-makers, he pictured the dictatorships expanding their South American trade, subsidizing friendly politicians, supplying military instructors and industrial advisers, putting us "on the defensive in our own backyard."

"Of course this seems very remote," he used to conclude. "But these are remote possibilities which no far-sighted man can overlook. It's our job to take care of that kind of possibility. And I regard repeal

of the embargo as the greatest step we can take to guard the country's interests, both to keep the peace and in the event of war."

Hull, who did his missionary work in quiet chats in his unpretentious apartment at the Carlton Hotel, spoke more of principle and of the situation's economic side. His language was extremely salty, and much of it has been preserved. He told the Senators and Congressmen they were "making the mistake of their lives" to view the oncoming conflict as "another goddam piddling dispute over a boundary line." It would be no local war, he said, but an assault on the peace of the world by "powerful nations, armed to the teeth, preaching the doctrine of naked force and practising a philosophy of barbarism." Of the embargo itself, he remarked bitterly that we had "substituted a wretched little bob-tailed, sawed-off domestic statute for the established rules of international law," and by so doing had "conferred a gratuitous benefit on the probable aggressors, depriving those who would resist them of the right to buy the wherewithal of resistance in this country."

"Why dammit," he once cried out, "these nations have told us again and again what they mean to do. Hitler intends to make himself the colossus of Europe, while Japan places her heel on Asia. If they succeed, we will have to transact our business with the rest of the world through Tokyo and Berlin. We know all this, and yet we retain this embargo, which directly encourages Hitler, makes war more likely, and threatens our own peace and safety. Back home we call people who do that kind of thing just plain chuckle-headed."

Unfortunately most of Hull's pleading and the President's reasoning might as well have been addressed

to the empty air. Just as he was entering the fight Hull got a good summary of the situation from his old friend, the Senate Republican leader, shrewd, cynical, tolerant Charles McNary of Oregon. McNary's partisanship has worn thin in years of Senate service. He delights to beat the administration, yet he will help his enemies to make Congress face big issues calmly and intelligently. Hull invited him to the Carlton and made his plea. Personally a mild isolationist, McNary, was unconvinced. Then Hull, knowing McNary's penchant for behind-the-scenes co-operation, asked his opinion of the chances for action during the session.

"Well, Cordell," replied McNary in his funny, judgmatical tone, "I don't just exactly know how the boys stand, but I guess you will be in for considerable trouble if you press repeal of the embargo. Some people feel pretty strongly, and most of the rest don't want to do anything now."

At Hull's request McNary checked the Senate further, returning a week later with a report which was supported by the findings of the Democratic leaders. On the straight question of repeal or no repeal, repeal had a majority; but the isolationists were spoiling for a long debate and there was no majority to bring the question to vote. The trouble was the same lack of liaison between cable-readers and non-cable-readers which had tripped up the President in his meeting with the Military Affairs Committee. Tips of another appeasement were circulating in Washington, originating in the City of London and the Paris Bourse, where appeasement was desired, and in French and English leftist circles, where it was then feared. Nothing promotes wish-thinking so much as the hope

of political advantage, and the leading isolationists, feeling their course weakened by the threat of war, sedulously repeated the tips. Senators and Representatives, sour against New Deal domestic policy, anxious for a short session, believed the isolationists rather than the President and Hull. "There will be no war," they told themselves complacently, "the issue can be deferred." If they had thought otherwise, repeal would have been voted.

The President and Hull struggled on, but only from disappointment to disappointment. The Senate was so sluggish that it was decided in June to start the final drive in the House, where repeal had to be sponsored by Sol Bloom, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee. The pushing impresario of George Washington, the Constitution and, in the forgotten '90's, of a cooch dancer at the Chicago World's Fair, Bloom is one of the Congressional seniority system's broadest jokes. He promised great things. Yet one late June night, after many administration members had gone to bed, the House voted amendments virtually nullifying repeal's effect. In the Senate meanwhile, after the President had asked bumbling Majority Leader Alben Barkley to breakfast and told him the repeal fight must be made, law-makers longing to get home to mend their fences had begun openly plotting rebellion. Worse still, three pro-repeal members of the Foreign Relations Committee, Walter George of Georgia, Guy Gillette of Iowa, and Wallace White of Maine, shared the comforting conviction that "the issue could be deferred" because there would be no war. The end came on July 11, when the Senate Committee voted, 12 to 11, not to report a bill.

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Thus the struggle reached its penultimate scene, an unhappy postlude which too clearly revealed the reason for our ersatz foreign policy. Refusing to surrender, the President and Hull decided to hold a White House meeting of Senate leaders, to discuss reversal of the committee's action. Barkley arranged it, rounding up McNary, Pittman, Vice President John Garner, the old veteran, William Borah, and McNary's assistant, serious Warren Austin. On the appointed evening, the President, Hull, and Steve Early received Garner and the Senators in the upstairs study of the White House. There was a grog tray in the corner. While the Senators made themselves drinks the President, comfortably ensconced on the big couch by the empty fireplace, joked with Garner about the proper way to compound an old-fashioned. The atmosphere was easily genial. They were all men in the same trade, taking their shirt-sleeved ease together, until the President called the meeting to order on a rather solemn note.

"It might be the proper thing," he said, "to open this meeting with prayer; our decision may well affect not only the people of our own country, but also the peoples of the world."

Then he plunged in, telling the story he had told so often before, emphasizing the danger of war, outlining war's possible consequences, rehearsing the arguments for repeal of the embargo. He spoke temperately but grimly, and he avoided the daring speculations he had offered in his earlier talks. Instead, he dwelt at length on the authenticity of his information, describing his constant exchanges with British and French leaders, mentioning all sorts of supporting testimony, trying hard to make the Senators believe that war really

threatened. They listened intently for over an hour. As a sort of peroration he recapitulated his repeated efforts in behalf of peace, and ended quite simply :

"But now I've fired my last shot. I think I ought to have another round in my belt."

"Mr. President," put in McNary, "am I right in understanding that you believe there is a probability of war between now and the next regular session of Congress?"

"I don't say there's a probability," replied the President, "but I am certain there is a very strong possibility."

Hull, taking up where the President left off, went considerably further. He positively predicted war by the summer's end. He stated flatly that embargo repeal would reduce the chance of war by at least half. He urged again and again that this country's interests were vitally involved. As he talked on, his pleading grew more vehement, his emotion less controlled. At first no one broke in. But after a time Borah, the great leader of the isolationists, the hero of the League fight, could keep silence no longer while his most cherished theories were trampled on.

"No one can foretell what may happen," Borah said, interrupting Hull. "But my feeling and belief is that we are not going to have a war. Germany isn't ready for it."

"I wish the Senator would come down to my office and read the cables," Hull answered, with a sort of sad patience. "I'm sure he would come to the conclusion that there's far more danger of war than he thinks."

"So far as the reports in your Department are concerned, I wouldn't be bound by them," countered

Borah firmly. "I have my own sources of information which I have provided for myself, and on several occasions I've found them more reliable than the State Department"

Such was the crucial exchange, which should stand for many years as a symbol of the results of divided responsibility in the formation of foreign policy. When Borah announced that he had better information than the State Department, there was a moment when no one spoke. Even to his friends—and most of the men present were admiringly attached to the great old man—his amazing statement seemed to embody all the occasional arrogance of those who do not read the cables towards those who do. Tears actually came to Hull's eyes, and when the discussion began again and someone asked his opinion, he said bitterly that he had nothing further to offer in view of Borah's remark. Always jolly, Garner smoothed matters over, and a little later brought the meeting to a close by asking Barkley straight out whether he had the votes to bring up repeal on the Senate floor. Barkley admitted he did not, and Garner went round the circle, getting exactly the same answer from all the others. Then he turned to the President.

"Well, Captain," he said, "we may as well face the facts. You haven't got the votes, and that's all there is to it."

The President, lying back on his sofa, smoking his cigarette, nodded between puffs. Where Hull seemed almost broken, the President had expected the meeting's conclusion from the start, and was good-humoured about it. His only reply to Garner was that he had done his best, and that the Senate must now take the responsibility. Borah put in that there would be

"no difficulty about that." Thereat the President asked for a pad and pencil, wrote out statements for Hull and Barkley to give the reporters waiting in the White House portico, and said good-bye to his guests. The meeting broke up in laughter.

"ARE YOU READY?"

Yet the meeting was no laughing matter. Repeal of the arms embargo was the crux of the President's foreign policy. "Methods short of war," the distinction between political and economic commitments in Europe, "disarmament and an opening of trade," the theory that neutrals were "parties at interest" in a modern world conflict—all these concepts were less immediately important than repeal. With repeal refused the United States almost ceased, for a while, to *have* a foreign policy.

At this time, to be sure, there was an important development in the Far Eastern field. From the first invasion of China, American policy had been to prevent the Japanese from establishing themselves firmly until the English and French were ready to help put them in their place. During the spring of 1939, however, in the famous Tientsin incident, the English had shown signs of willingness to try a little Far Eastern appeasement. The President and Hull had long been considering termination of our commercial treaty with Japan, which would permit an embargo on Japanese trade, and thus threaten the Japanese militarists with the closing of their main source of desperately needed war materials. As signs of English weakness and Japanese domineering multiplied in China, the President and Hull reached their decision. After a

long talk at the White House, Hull secretly consulted members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on treaty termination. Then, perhaps because friends told him what was up, Senator Arthur Vandenberg introduced a resolution demanding that the treaty be terminated. Such a signal from a leading isolationist was all the President and Hull could ask. Termination took place late in July.

Yet the termination of the Japanese treaty was a side venture, as it were. After the collapse of the repeal drive, the effort to keep the peace was over, and all energies were concentrated on the quite different effort to prepare the country for shock of war abroad. The first preparations had started long before, when Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr., dropped in on the President during one of the most menacing days of the April crisis. The President had asked him :

"Henry, are you ready for the worst ? Because things look so bad you ought to be."

And Morgenthau, horrified, had hurried back to his office to get ready. In the ensuing week, the Treasury was the scene of a remarkable succession of meetings, at which Morgenthau and his aides planned war-time protection of the American economy with representatives of the State and Agriculture Departments, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Reserve Board, the New York Federal Reserve Bank, and the New York Stock Exchange. Arrangements were made, in conjunction with the British and French Treasuries, to forestall uncontrolled liquidation of foreign-owned American securities. The SEC and Stock Exchange braced themselves to meet panic, first by a careful joint *patrol of the exchange floor*, and then,

if necessary, by stopping trading. The Reserve Board prepared to lighten restrictions on bank credit, and agreed with the Treasury to spend up to \$500,000,000 in protecting the government bond market, while George Harrison of the New York Reserve Bank accepted the task of persuading the big New York bankers not to dump their huge bond-holdings on a falling market. It was decided that in war-time the tripartite currency stabilization agreement would have to become inoperative, and a system of monetary control was approved for emergencies. Then, when every financial eventuality had been provided for, the entire programme was embodied in a group of executive orders, and when they had been passed by the President and the Justice Department, these were stored in Morgenthau's safe, to be used as needed when war came.

Everywhere in the government, all through that spring and early summer, preparations for war were afoot. In Congress, a \$2,000,000,000 national defence bill was passed. In the War, Navy, and Treasury Departments, they were buying strategic raw materials from which war might cut us off. Officers in the Navy Department's war-plans division foregathered with men from the War Department and the State Department's legal adviser's office, to work on the proclamations of neutrality and supplemental orders to numerous departments and agencies which the outbreak of war would require the President to issue. Even the Justice Department, remembering Black Tom, built up an increased organization for counter-espionage. In the President's mind, also, the thought of war was never absent. Once, when Attorney General Frank Murphy came to discuss counter-espionage with him, he outlined the alternatives confronting the country.

veteran of the last war, Bernard Baruch, had been expressing concern to the President over the state of national defence. A year or so before, Baruch had been so troubled by our small production of smokeless powder that he had offered to advance £3,600,000 of his own to build a smokeless-powder plant for the government. The office of the Assistant Secretary of War is legally charged with the periodic preparation of industrial mobilization plans, and Johnson had been particularly insistent in pressing the President for the appointment of a civilian advisory committee of industrial experts to check his plan. During the spring both Baruch and Johnson had revived this proposal. Early in August, as soon as Congress was out, the President was leaving for a short vacation, and he must have remembered Baruch's and Johnson's arguments and decided that the matter ought to be taken care of before he left. At any rate, after a Cabinet meeting on August 4, he invited Johnson and Sumner Welles into his office and announced to them, "I want to set up a War Resources Board."

In a long discussion of personnel, the President favoured men from the "younger group," and when Johnson reeled off a list of candidates for chairman of the proposed board, told him that Edward Stettinius, chairman of the U.S. Steel Company, was "the man." Stettinius was drafted by telephone from the White House, and a few days later he and Johnson, Acting Secretary of the Navy Charles Edison, and several other War and Navy Department men met in Johnson's office to pick the rest of the board members. When they had finished they called the President, and he approved. Then came the rub. Although the board's function was intended to be purely advisory, its mere

appointment was sure to cause some alarm. Actually the alarm was vastly increased by a foolishly phrased announcement in which Johnson and Edison implied the board would take over American industry when war came.

STRANGE TALE OF HITLER AND STALIN

The President, meanwhile, had other things to think of. Hitler was already gathering his forces for the attack on Poland, and England and France, having guaranteed help to Poland, Rumania, and Turkey, were in the last abortive stages of their negotiations with the Soviet Union. War was obviously possible at any moment. Hull was away, resting after his fruitless struggle for repeal of the arms embargo. On the evening of August 5, the President had a long talk with Sumner Welles. With the embargo unrepealed, this country's voice had little authority, yet a final plea for peace seemed to Welles and the President a necessary gesture. Although the Rome-Berlin axis had been all but broken, Rome was presumed to retain influence with Berlin, and since he had refused to sign the mobilization orders at the time of Munich, the King of Italy was thought to be Rome's leading peace-man. Accordingly it was decided, when the war crisis came, to address a message to Victor Emmanuel begging him to exert his country's influence in peace's cause.

At the same time, both the President and Welles thought that war might come not after a prolonged crisis, but as a blitzkrieg. On the outbreak of war, the President was determined to request the belligerents to promise not to bomb open towns. He and Welles also wished to make the outbreak of war the immediate

signal for an emergency Pan-American conference, at which the nations of the Americas could plan their policy together. Fearing a blitzkrieg, Welles passed the next day writing the note on air-bombing and the Pan-American conference call, which had been provided for in the Declaration of Lima. That evening he went again to the White House, where he found the President working late in his study with Missy LeHand. He gave his drafts to the President, who read them carefully and edited them. The summer night was warm; both men were wakeful, and for a while they discussed the plight of the world. Then, just as midnight showed on the big clock on the mantel, the President signed the drafts and Welles took them back to his office, to be put away until doomsday. The President left Washington the next morning.

Meanwhile the event had already occurred which made world catastrophe a virtual certainty. Some time between August 1 and August 5, the German Ambassador in Moscow, Count Von der Schulenburg, indicated to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Molotov, that his master Adolf Hitler was ready to negotiate a Russo-German pact. The President had hardly arrived at Hyde Park when word of the German overture reached the State Department.

It has, of course, been generally supposed that this extraordinary alliance, which formed the vast territory from the North Sea to the shores of the Pacific into a union of tyranny, came as a complete surprise to the foreign offices of other nations. Actually the United States had been suspicious of such a development since 1934, while the English and French, also warned, simply refused to credit the incredible. The giver of the warning was Bullitt, a prophet of annoying

accuracy, who reported that soon after the Roehm blood bath demonstrated the efficiency of the German dictator, Stalin offered Hitler a partnership against the Western world. At that time Stalin's offer was turned down, for Hitler still feared England and had not yet abandoned his plan of a drive to the East. Discussion of the question was never completely broken off, however, being carried on through extra-diplomatic channels, by trade missions and in contacts between the high commands of the German and Russian armies.

By January, 1939, Hitler's feeling for England had altered sufficiently, under the combined influence of Von Ribbentrop's slick persuasions and the weakness of English policy, to allow the secret Russo German discussions to take on a brief new life. Then in May, after Molotov had replaced Litvinov as Foreign Commissar, and after the English had reached for their tentative agreement with the Poles, Hitler made his first definite move. Von der Schulenburg was sent to Molotov, to tell him that the German anti-Comintern agreements were really meaningless, to point out that the English were the true common enemies of Russia and Germany, and to suggest closer trade and other relations between the two countries. As Hitler's purpose was only to keep Russia out of the Anglo-Franco-Polish front, Von der Schulenburg was somewhat taken aback when Molotov replied that closer trade relations were all very well, but what Stalin most desired was closer political relations.

Negotiation of a trade agreement was begun, but Hitler still hoped to persuade the Poles to give in on Danzig and the Corridor and join him in an attack on the Ukraine. Accordingly a definite response to Molotov's suggestion was delayed, and while Molotov

prodded Von der Schulenburg for an answer, Stalin opened discussions of the anti-German front with the English and French. Then came the abortive Danzig crisis of July, which convinced Hitler that the Poles would not give way, and produced the climax of this fantastic tale of double-dealing in the first days of August.

To round the tale out, the English and French received the same information as the State Department, but were told there was nothing to it by their ambassadors in Moscow, Sir William Seeds and M. Paul Émile Naggiar. Seeds and Naggiar were convinced by the loud and quite honest protestations of the Soviet War Commissar, Klementi Voroshilov, who was carrying on the discussions with the English and French in blank ignorance of the doings of Stalin and Molotov. Only the Chinese benefited by our knowledge. A private emissary, sent by plane from Chungking by Chiang Kai-Shek, visited Bullitt in Paris on August 8 and received news of what was afoot. The information, cabled back to Chungking, caused the Chinese Generalissimo to refuse to conclude a treaty offered by Russia, and pressed for by several influential members of the executive Yuan. But by August 16, the very day when Voroshilov intimated to the English and French missions that if Poland would only admit a Russian Army the Soviets would join the front against Hitler, the terms of the Russo-German pact had been fully agreed upon between Von der Schulenburg and Molotov.

Sumner Welles, in charge of the State Department, well understood what all this must mean. On the private Hyde Park wire, he and the President discussed the new developments in Moscow with a deep anxiety.

Both were aware of the English and French incredulity, both were strongly inclined to take the opposite view, and so inclining, concluded that war was inevitable. The President, who was also very tired, was planning to make a short sea trip on the cruiser *Tuscaloosa*. With war impending, he thought of cancelling his plan, and on the morning of August 12, when he was scheduled to leave, he was ready to order the *Tuscaloosa* back to her station. Very early, he talked on the transatlantic telephone to Bullitt, who took an extremely gloomy view. Then at 9 a.m. he called Welles, and asked for an opinion.

"Mr. President," said Welles solemnly, "war is probably a matter of a week or ten days."

"Oh, in that case I really have a couple of weeks to get a rest," replied the President, who has a theory that his advisers telescope time schedules. "I'll go, but I'll arrange to be always on call."

Thereafter it was chiefly necessary to muster patience to await what would come. While the President gained strength and got a sunburn in the bays and inlets of the northern New England coast, Welles was in charge in Washington. By August 16, the auguries were so dark that he and Berle drafted the message to the King of Italy and radioed it to the President. On August 17, Welles convened the first meeting of an Inter-Departmental Neutrality Committee, summoning to his office Johnson, Edison, Berle, Assistant Attorney General Thurman Arnold, Under Secretary of the Treasury John Hanes, and one or two others. Placing before them the proclamations and orders tentatively prepared by the Navy, War, and State Department men during the spring, he told the committee members, "The European situation is now so bad that I think we ought

to be ready for the worst." The committee went to work on the papers, and lights began to burn late in government offices, for hundreds of details had to be seen to.

Then on August 21, the Russo-German pact was announced in Berlin. The cables of the twenty-second brought the reaction. In London the British preserved their sang-froid, and seemed pleased that the bewildered Soviet Ambassador, Maisky, had excused the announcement as a German trick to drive a wedge between Russia and England. From Paris came despairing predictions of immediate war, and news of General Gamelin's orders for full mobilization. In Warsaw, Colonel Beck's complacency approached the idiotic. And in Berlin, where the Soviet Ambassador was again bewildered, German officials were crudely boastful. Studying this tragi-comedy, Welles, Berle, and Moffat decided to radio the President that the time had come for the message to the King of Italy. The President, hurrying back to Washington, sent his re-draft of the message on ahead, and it was cabled to Rome on the evening of August 23. Next morning Welles met the President at the Union Station, and rode with him to the White House, describing the latest developments on the way. The President could only repeat, "It seems unbelievable, really unbelievable." Yet before he left the motor he had decided to send two more last-chance messages, urging Hitler and Poland's President Moseicki to use every resource of peaceful negotiation to compose their differences.

Unhappily the messages, prepared by Welles and Berle, corrected by the President and got off the same evening, were no more than gestures. The tempo was now so fast that gestures had lost their usefulness.

Hull was back, and the death watch was re-established in his office. The Inter-Departmental Neutrality Committee was working day and night. The bond market was already slipping, and the Treasury and Reserve Board, while they poured in millions, were showing signs of differing over policy. As another gesture, the President had ordered the German liner *Bremen* to be held in New York ; something had to be done with it. But the cables told the real story. On the evening of August 25, the cables inspired Berle to note in his diary :

"A rather shattering day, as during it the nerve ganglia of Europe began to decay. I have a horrible feeling of seeing a civilization breaking, of seeing it dying before its actual death. The Polish wire went down, and Biddle had to communicate with us by telephone via Moscow ; cable stoppages began to pile up in Berlin ; direct line sailings left various points without even mail communication, and through it all one saw how delicate a fabric this thing we call civilization is."

When Moscicki managed to answer the President's message, gratefully declaring his complete willingness to negotiate all questions between Poland and Germany, Hull, Welles, and Berle took the answer to the White House. Their talk with the President was full of a frustrated sense of the pointlessness of protest ; all of them knew that one man alone held power of decision on the future of the world. They agreed to communicate Moscicki's answer to Hitler, suggesting that if he would also negotiate, all might yet be well. But the President expressed their real feelings when he said wearily :

"At any rate this puts the issue squarely up

to Germany, which no one bothered to do in 1914."

There was nothing more worth trying, and although the President spoke of a general conference to "arrange a peace without having the war first," he knew as well as the others that this was wishful thinking. By August 28 Berle was writing in his diary that "the last couple of days have produced exactly the sensation you might have waiting for a jury to bring in a verdict on the life or death of about 10,000,000 people." Then, early in the morning of September 1, the one-man jury's verdict was brought in.

WHEN WAR CAME

IN GOVERNMENTS, AS in persons, the immediate response to a great event is likely to be unexpected, even somewhat improbable. Certainly this is true of the response of the government of the United States to the outbreak of the Second World War, of which the first effect in Washington was chiefly to interrupt the sleep of the President and his principal subordinates.

On that morning of September 1, 1939, the President was awakened before dawn by William Christian Bullitt, calling from Paris to announce Germany's invasion of Poland. Snapping on the light, propping himself up on his pillow and lighting a cigarette, he telephoned Cordell Hull and Sumner Welles, Harry Woodring, and Charles Edison, to pass on the tragic news. Woodring and Edison roused General Marshall, chief of staff of the Army, and Admiral Stark, chief of naval operations. Soon wireless messages warning of war were on their way to naval vessels in both oceans and to army posts scattered from Samoa to Fort Devens, Mass.

While Woodring and Edison stayed at home listening tensely to their radios, Hull and Welles rose, dressed, and drove to the State Department through the empty, echoing streets. One of Hull's staff had been keeping all-night vigil. He notified other leading men in the

Department, and soon after Hull reached his office Adolph Berle, Pierrepont Moffat, and one or two more joined him there, to wait anxiously for incoming cables. As Welles's motor sped in from his big country place at Oxon Hill, the first light was faintly gilding the fat Maryland country-side, yet the sun was scarcely up when Welles opened his office safe. He got out the note pleading with belligerents not to bomb open towns, which he and the President had foresightedly prepared early in August. Glancing hurriedly through it, he took it upstairs to be put on the wire for Warsaw and Berlin. Then he, too, joined the group with Hull.

For a time they listened to Hitler speaking to the Reichstag. About 6 a.m. they telephoned Under Secretary of the Treasury John Hanes and Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board Marriner Eccles, who had to be told to stand by for trouble in the government bond market. But there was really little to do. For the most part they sat gloomily around Hull's desk, talking of the war in the hushed, polite, meaningless way of people gathering for a funeral. They were almost bored, and only Berle rose to the occasion with a phrase, remarking: "We are ending our death watch over Europe."

As for the President, he has a healthy nervous system and had dropped off to sleep again. He slept until 6.30, when another call came through from Bullitt. In the interval Bullitt had talked with Daladier. The French Premier had been philosophic, resigned, and desperately sad. He had said categorically that his country and England must go to Poland's aid, or lose both their moral standing before the world and their last chance to offer effective resistance to the onward march of Hitlerism. Bullitt had been convinced.

family photographs ; Welles, stiff and correct as always in his chair by the bed, and the President, wearing his blue bed-cape, easy against his pillows, with his finished breakfast tray pushed off by his side—was oddly the same as during the morning talks after Munich, nearly a year before. One of the decisions of the talks after Munich was to try to weld the Americas into a closer unity, both economic and political. War, pre-occupying European rivals, raising many problems in common between us and the other American nations, gave an opportunity to develop this policy further. The President and Welles immediately decided that they would call a special Pan-American conference, such as they had long planned, as soon as England and France entered the war. Welles promised to rough out a conference agenda for early discussion. This led the President to bring up one of his favourite schemes, for a marine security zone insulating the entire Western Hemisphere against naval warfare.

Its motivation was simple. Months before, European cables had brought a report of a German plan to attack Allied shipping in American waters, using a fleet of submarines with a supply ship based in one of the more obscure and purchasable Central American ports. Another current theory was that Germany would attack British possessions in the Americas. The President and Welles, fearing the effect of such developments on public emotion, also remembered that inter-American commerce had been virtually cut off during

had a right to warn belligerent vessels off our sea lanes, jumped at the idea. Expert in naval history, he even searched the precedents himself. Only a few days before, in the midst of the war crisis, he had reminded Berle how John Adams founded the U.S. Navy during the Anglo-French war of 1798, buying twenty-four new frigates to protect our shipping from English and French privateers in the West Indies. In truth the President thought that his security zone, subsequently so much criticized, would have been approved by the founding fathers.

Now he and Welles agreed that the zone's establishment ought to be proposed to the forthcoming Pan-American Conference. As the President had laid it out, the scheme for the zone called for patrol by the Navy of the waters actually adjacent to the United States. When Welles left him, therefore, he sent for Edison, and ordered him to go to work on a tentative operating plan for this patrol, which he called "the neutrality patrol." He told Edison: "If anything happens off our coasts, we want to know about it."

Then the President put on his clothes and went to his office for an early Press conference, after which Hull came over from the Department. Both men wanted to talk to Bullitt and Kennedy, the chargé, Alexander Kirk, in Berlin, and the unfortunate Tony Biddle in Warsaw, but that day the transatlantic wire was badly troubled with "diplomatic static." While the President fruitlessly held the instrument, waiting for connections which were always just on the point of being made, he and Hull reviewed the general situation. With Welles he had worked on one of the main strands of policy, the unification of the hemisphere; with Hull he now took up the other, which

was to aid England and France by "methods short of war."

They well knew that the needs of England and France were pressing. France had long been frantically buying American planes and other war supplies. The English Government, hoping for repeal of the arms embargo, had sent a representative, Lord Riverdale, to study purchasing methods with the Treasury's procurement division during the summer. Feeling it would be bad policy for J. P. Morgan and Company to reappear as the English purchasing agent, the President himself had actually intervened to suggest the appointment of a public purchasing commission—needlessly, as it happened, since both the English embassy and the Morgan partners shared his view. Indeed, it had been as much to help the English and French as to reduce the chance of war, that the President and Hull had vainly sought repeal of the arms embargo in the spring.

Now, of course, it was necessary to apply the embargo, but both Hull and the President felt that with men's minds suddenly and brutally cleared by war, repeal would be fairly easy. They quickly determined to call a special session of Congress for the purpose, after a short interval to allow opinion to mature. Hull bitterly pointed out that war might not have come if opinion had matured a little earlier, but the President was too preoccupied with the future to think of the past. For a while before they parted, he talked seriously to Hull of the possible post-war world, of the disarmament and opening of trade which he had always in mind as the only avenues of return to common sense, and of this country's heavy post-war responsibility for the restoration of order and security.

The President's talk with Hull was incongruously interrupted by Fiorello La Guardia and Grover Whalen, who arrived, richly caparisoned, on World's Fair business. The day's last important event was the war Cabinet meeting at 2 p.m. The Cabinet members, many of whom had flown back from vacations, hurried in early. The long white Cabinet room, with its portraits of Jackson and Jefferson and its big windows on the clipped White House garden, is a pleasant spot. Usually early arrivals exchange jokes and gossip, but this time most of them took their places at once, to sit in an uneasy hush until Pat McKenna, the usher, threw open the door at the room's end and announced: "The President, gentlemen." He came in looking rather grey and drawn, without his customary bantering greetings. Seating himself at the head of the table, he began simply: "It's no use repeating the news to you. You have it already."

After stating that it was certain the English and French would fight, he asked for reports from the Departments. The war raised many problems, from increased protection for the Panama Canal to enforcement of the arms embargo at the ports. Being routine matters, they were rapidly disposed of, and the President went on to what was really on his mind. During the preceding crisis he had been much troubled by his memory of the tremendous rise of the cost of living during the First World War. He had already ordered the Labour Department to organize a day-to-day price-reporting service. If the reports proved bad, he seemed to be set on taking drastic steps. He told the Cabinet: "You may recall that most of the price rises in the last war occurred before we went in. It might be well, this time, to

consider exercising some sort of price control immediately."

Feeling was strong in the Cabinet, however, that it would be wiser to wait and see how prices reacted, meanwhile using such existing control devices as the Justice Department's anti-trust division. The topic was deferred, and another topic introduced when Secretary of Labour Frances Perkins asked whether a Labour member could not be appointed to the War Resources Board.

It has already been seen how the board, originally intended as a mere civilian advisory committee on industrial mobilization, was mis-announced as a war-time administrative body of vast but vague powers. By this time the board had become a symbol of all their fears to those who were saying: "We'll be in soon, whether we like it or not." Even some of the Cabinet were surprised when the President replied to Miss Perkins that the board was "purely temporary and ought not to be made too elaborate," and compared the board's job to a preventive study of typhoid suppression in a district where typhoid epidemics were extremely rare. He went on to recall that the Council of National Defence, established in the First World War and composed of the Attorney-General and Secretaries of State, War, Navy, Interior, and Labour, was still a legal entity.

"We aren't going into this war," said the President. "But just supposing we should, I'd rather work through an agency like the council, which is based on the existing machinery of the Government."

He repeatedly warned the Cabinet against preparing for war, telling them only to familiarize themselves with war-time problems. He reiterated again and

again his statement that "we are not going in." At the same time, he indicated that even while still at peace it might become necessary to put the country on an emergency basis, and for this purpose also he proposed to use the council. He had first thought of the council as long before as 1937, when Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson began pressing him to appoint a War Resources Board. At the Cabinet meeting he went into its history at some length, described in detail how it might operate, and even named his choice for its statistical co-ordinator—Isador Lubin, commissioner of labour statistics, who was gathering the price figures for him. Then he told the Cabinet that he would soon call a special session for repeal of the embargo, revealed that he planned a radio address to the country when England and France declared war, and warned them to remain in Washington over the week-end. And so the war Cabinet meeting broke up, still in gloom.

Such was the scene in which, more than in any other of this history, may be observed the strains and tensions, unrealities and exaggerations of a difficult period. The President's real war policy was more fully revealed in another incident of the time, when War Department officials brought him plans for much-needed army reorganization. When he saw that one plan contemplated accumulation of reserves to equip a large expeditionary force for Europe, he put his foot down hard, declaring firmly: "You can base your calculations on an army of 750,000 men, for whatever happens, we won't send troops abroad. We need only think of defending this hemisphere."

Yet by hindsight the mood of the moment seems exaggerated. The concern over prices, the thought

of a national emergency administered by the Council of National Defence, even the security-zone scheme—all these turned out to be unnecessary. Prices remained fairly normal, the war stimulated rather than disrupted the American economy, and so far inter-American commerce has not been seriously threatened. Nevertheless, plotting the wisest course by hindsight is always easy. The President, going to bed after an exhausting day, wondering if the great source cities of our culture would soon be engulfed in smoking ruin, could hardly be expected to know what we know now. And if exaggerations were indulged in because the war was expected to be more catastrophic than at first, at least, it proved, the basic outlines of American policy, the unification of the Western Hemisphere, and aid of the Allies by methods short of war, were also being successfully blocked in.

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 2.—The first day of the war had been a day of hasty action and hurried conference. This second day was a day of waiting and preparation. Early in the morning the President telephoned the State Department to ask that drafts be prepared of the proposed address to the country. Originally he had been reluctant to make the address, feeling that he could not tell the people the whole truth about the European situation, and thus ought not to talk at all. But Steve Early and others in his entourage had urged on him the need to soothe the hysteria of the moment, and he had come round to their view. This morning he discussed the proposed speech with Hull, who fully agreed with Early. Hull promised to have a draft prepared. He runs his Department on a peculiar system, retaining general control, but delegating special

duties to certain men, so that Welles, for example, is predominant in the South American field, while Berle is the Departmental drafting officer. Now he called in Berle, told him generally what the President wanted, and asked him to go to work. Berle is always more literary, more formally eloquent, and less guarded than the President. Little of Berle's draft was to see the light, for the President is far more adept at the art of confecting a usable speech. But if only for the phrasing and its re-creation of the emotion of those days, it is worth recording Berle's most striking passage :

"Now that force is opposed to force ; and as through suffering truth becomes plain, I think we shall find that at last there is only one clear issue in Europe ; an issue so great and so clear that it suggests the inevitable outcome. At long last you will probably find that there are ranged on one side people who believe in an ordered world, based on principle, and on the other groups who believe in little save cynical force. It is always dangerous to prophesy, but I hold the faith that the world will then resume its age-old endeavour to re-establish the principles of justice, of equity, and of law. So it has always been ; and so, I think, it will be again."

While Berle wrote at the Department and the others waited for the cables, the President was in his office, also hoping for news. About midday he heard a report on the military situation in Europe from the military and naval intelligence officers, Colonel John Magruder and Rear-Admiral Walter Anderson, who were to become his regular interpreters of war strategy. Then at 1.30 he got Berle's draft, and a little later some other material he had asked for. After reading

through the pile of papers he put it on one side, as his habit is, and began dictating his own version to his stenographer, Grace Tully.

During the whole day he was still trying to get through to his ambassadors in Europe, but he only managed to speak once or twice to Bullitt and Kennedy. All reports were to the same effect; the French and English were awaiting the expiration of their ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of German troops from Polish soil, while Hitler's agents were desperately attempting to re-establish contact with the remaining appeasers. The appeasement faction in the English Cabinet had been virtually reduced, however, to Sir John Simon, with Chamberlain's confidential adviser, Sir Horace Wilson, to lend him tepid support. The conclusion was foregone, and this day the State Department death watch broke up early, for a listless croquet game between Hull, Berle, and Moffat on Berle's broad lawn at Woodley on the hill above the city. At the White House in the evening, the President had Robert Jackson, then Solicitor-General, to supper with him. They talked grimly of what mass bombings of great cities might mean—it must be recalled that this was the thought then obsessing every mind—and then the President went to bed early.

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 3.—A few minutes after 4 a.m., the President was waked by the telephone ringing by his bed. It was Joe Kennedy, on the wire from London. That morning Chamberlain was to announce to the British Empire: "We are at war with Germany, and may God give the victory to the right." His speech was scheduled for 11 a.m. European time, and he had shown it to Kennedy a couple of hours

before delivery. Being easily emotional, Kennedy had read it with unashamed tears in his eyes. Still deeply moved, always bearish, and more appeasement-minded than any other American policy-maker, Kennedy was in a state of unrelieved despair when he recited the gist of the speech to the President. He foresaw dark ages, predicting that, whoever won, chaos would be the war's real victor. He kept saying : "It's the end of the world, the end of everything."

The President, who does not share Kennedy's temperamental bearishness, did his best to give his ambassador a transatlantic pat on the back. Then once more he roused members of his Cabinet with news of war, and most of the incidents of the morning of September 1 were half-automatically repeated. At the State Department Welles immediately sent out the call to a Pan-American conference, which had been written, like the note on bombing, in the first days of August. The others in Hull's office meanwhile considered, as one of them put it, "the state of a world slowly smashing itself to fragments."

After sleeping again, the President rose early, and passed most of the morning putting the finishing touches to his radio address. At 11.45 Welles came over with his promised rough agenda for the Pan-American conference and a map on which the security zone was pencilled in. He had made the zone a belt exactly 100 miles wide, stretching all around the shores of the hemisphere. A line following the coast so exactly seemed too complex for easy navigation, and the President re-drew the map with the help of a ruler on his desk, widening the zone to an average of 300 miles and straightening its boundary. Then the agenda was discussed.

It contained three points : (1) To prevent any breakdown in inter-American trade, it was proposed to establish the zone. (2) To make treatment of neutrality problems identical throughout the Americas, and to achieve, in so far as possible, a unified hemispheric foreign policy, it was proposed to form an inter-American neutrality committee, to sit for the duration of the war. (3) To strengthen our economic ties with South America, as well as to help the South American countries through their war-time economic difficulties, it was proposed to form an inter-American economic committee, similar to the neutrality committee. For our part it was also proposed to begin intensive promotion of our goods in South America, and to use the resources of the United States, both public and private, to finance South American production of goods we could take in exchange. All three points were later to be favourably acted on at the conference at Panama; the inter-American neutrality and economic committees are, in fact, in session at Rio and Washington. On this morning of September 3, the President and Welles discussed them carefully but enthusiastically, and the President approved them all.

Then at 2.30 he asked Hull to join him in the comfortable Lincoln study to hear him read his radio address. Hull brought over Welles and Berle, and Louis Johnson, who had come in to talk national defence, was also there when they all pulled up chairs round the President's desk. While he read the others took notes. His points were simply made. Despite every effort to keep the peace, war had come, and "when peace has been broken anywhere, the peace of all countries is in danger." Yet no one must "falsely talk of America sending its armies to European fields." Neutrality

would be the American policy, and the Neutrality Act would be fully enforced until revised. Propaganda must be guarded against, and the unity of the Americas must be worked for. Every effort must be made to keep out of the war. And so he ended, his voice a little tired, but emphatic even for the small audience—"I hope the United States will keep out of this war. I believe that we will."

He was far from content that afternoon. He had an irrepressible sense of the horror of the event engulfing the world; he might have preferred to cry havoc, yet the necessities of the situation had required him to speak calmly. "I hate to be a Pollyanna," he said irritably, of the speech. Nevertheless, he agreed to cut out one or two phrases too directly naming the original aggressor, and only held firm when doubts were expressed of his famous reversal of Wilson—the request for neutrality in deed, followed by the rejection of neutrality in thought. Discussion of the address was not prolonged, for there was much more to do. Operating plans for neutrality patrol were brought in by Admiral Stark late in the afternoon, and the President, who sometimes plays with the Navy as another man might play with miniature trains, had a moment's happy relaxation discussing the plans and revising them. Stark hurried back to the Navy Department, to work with his subordinates until one the next morning organizing the navy for its patrol duty. Meanwhile the address to the nation was successfully delivered, and the President's day was over.

THE EMBARGO GOES

The time of most confusion ended with the address to the nation, yet in the next week events still tripped

on one another's heels. On Monday work began on the immediately necessary proclamations of neutrality and of enforcement of the Neutrality Act. Although these had been prepared in the Inter-Departmental Neutrality Committee before war broke, the always to be expected last-minute hitch appeared, in the shape of a controversy over whether to include Canada in the list of belligerents subject to the arms embargo. Legally, Canada belonged to the British Empire, which had declared war on Germany. Practically, the Canadian Parliament had not yet acted, and the inclusion of Canada would seem to question her independence. At first it was decided to stand on legality, but at a Tuesday morning White House conference attended by Hull, Welles, and Berle, Bob Jackson raised the point again. Someone objected that Canada's omission would upset the British Foreign Office, whereat the President replied that if he had to choose "between hurting the feelings of Canadians or the feelings of the Foreign Office," he would "take the Foreign Office any day." Just to make sure, he put a call through to his old friend, Canadian Premier, Mackenzie King, and Canada was left out.

The same afternoon, after issuing the neutrality proclamations, the President closeted himself with Bob Jackson. Jackson read through a long list of Presidential emergency powers. The President rejected most of them with a quick "That's out the window," and then told Jackson that he planned to exercise the rest—powers to increase the enlisted strength of the Army and Navy, to use unbudgeted funds to repatriate Americans stranded abroad, and the like—under a "proclamation of limited emergency." "I

President Roosevelt's pencilled draft of the proclamation

Whereas, The P. of U. S. has
issued Proclamations of neutrality
in the war now existing
between certain nations and

Whereas this war involves in
the said certain nations on
behalf of the proper representation
and the preparation
and execution of certain
military and naval measures
for the purpose of strengthening
our national defense and
a peaceful basis

and whereas the ~~present~~
measures required at this
time ~~and~~ call for

of national emergency on the outbreak of war in Europe

The exercise of ~~very~~ only a limited number of the powers granted in a national emergency

And therefore I do declare a national emergency. That this national emergency relates at this time solely to the subjects of the enforcement of neutrality ^{and} national defense. That under this provision ^{specific} authorization will be given by Res. to carry out these two purposes.

want it short, simple, non-technical, and strictly limited," he said. As limited emergency is not a legal concept, Jackson did not quite understand. The President thereupon scribbled the first paragraphs in his own hand. Jackson took the sheets of chit-paper, worked them up into the proclamation at the Justice Department, showed the result to Berle and other officials at the State Department, and had the proclamation ready for issuance on Wednesday, September 7. The President made the proclamation public with many careful warnings against giving it over-importance; yet this proclaiming of an emergency, not really necessary, bound to create alarm for all its limitations, must be regarded as the last hang-over from the exaggerated mood of September 1.

Thereafter, as the American markets boomed and the blitzkrieg still failed to materialise, the tension lessened continuously, and it was possible to concentrate effort on the main strands of policy. Because the Press had predicted it would be called for September 10, the special mission for repeal of the embargo was slightly deferred. The President, who secretly delights in making newspaper prophecy come out wrong, waited until a little after the tenth to telephone Congressional chieftains, Garner, Barkley, McNary, Speaker of the House, William Bankhead, and House Majority and Minority leaders, Sam Rayburn and Joseph Martin. All of them counselled prompt action, and the President gave the call for September 21. He had already pleaded for a perfectly non-partisan approach to war problems. Now he also prepared to compose his ancient quarrel with Congress, inviting the influential Democratic moderate, able, canny James Byrnes of South Carolina, to share in the Senate

management of embargo repeal, and promising not to infringe on the cherished but somewhat dubious independence of the legislative branch.

On September 13 the President sent out a call for drafts of his message to open the special session, and a State Department committee, including Berle, Assistant Secretary of State George Messersmith, Pierrepont Moffat, and several others, was named to work up pro-repeal material for the coming debate. Meanwhile Sumner Welles had been labouring to prepare the coming Pan-American Conference, which was set to begin at Panama simultaneously with the special session. The inter-American economic programme had already been launched, with slightly over-acted drama. From most of the South American nations had come enthusiastic responses to the President's and Welles' proposals. After a short tussle with the Argentine, where there was the habitual longing for delay, the conference agenda had been rapidly approved. Welles sailed for Panama September 15, with the prospects fair before him.

Four days later the President buckled down to writing his message. There was something of a controversy concerning it, for Hull and the former ambassador-at-large, Norman Davis, who had been called in again to give advice, strongly urged demanding outright repeal of all mandatory neutrality legislation. They took the highly tenable position that statutes rigidly prescribing the response to unknown future events were bad in principle, and they argued that on principle the President should accept nothing less than complete freedom of action. The Congressional chieftains had already warned the President, on the other hand, that if the arms embargo was to be removed from the

Neutrality Act, some other mandatory regulation would have to be substituted. Their plan was to offer a cash-and-carry measure, forbidding the extension of credit to belligerents and requiring them to transport their purchases in their own vessels.

The controversy must have been much on the President's mind that afternoon when he sent for Grace Tully, got out the draft messages already submitted to him, and settled down to dictation. Berle's draft embodied Hull's views. Additional drafts, taking different tacks, had come from other sources. The President paid little attention to any of them. After several false starts he achieved the compromise he wanted, in a curious but effective paper.

It was curious because it did not once refer to the real aim behind the repeal drive, to permit the democracies to use the United States as their arsenal. Instead, it opened with a general statement that all must work together in the cause of peace, rehearsed the story of the most recent aggressions, and recalled at great length the arguments of the message of the previous January on the state of the Union. It then repeated the arguments of international law, suggested that the Neutrality Act was neither neutral nor impartial, and denounced the illogic of embargoing one class of exports and not the rest. It outlined Hull's reasoning against mandatory legislation, also referred to the cash-and-carry plan, and left the choice to Congress. And it closed with a plea for no partisanship in perilous days. It was effective because it clearly stated, in telling phrases, what might be called all the secondary arguments. By the singular taboos of American politics, these arguments were most prominently used in the ensuing fight.

About 9.15 that evening Berle dropped in to see the result. The President, who was still at his dictation, greeted him with a broad grin and a cheerful announcement that he was "just finishing the penultimate paragraphs." When he had completed the message, he was sleepy, but he left the door open between the study and his bedroom, and talked with Berle about the world's future while he got ready for bed. They ranged the globe, forecasting the division of Eastern Europe between Germany and Russia, wondering whether Western Asia was also to be divided, and guessing at the chance of an ultimate German foothold in the Atlantic. Both thought that if Germany won the war, Hitler would try to get his hands on the Azores or Cape Verde Islands, as bases for operations against the Americas. But both agreed that the war's main danger to this country lay in the alternative prospects of post-war economic chaos or a world economy dominated by the dictatorships.

Next day was September 20. In the morning Hull was at the White House, going over the message with the President. They read it through carefully. Hull suggested some points strengthening the passage setting forth his position, and wanted an addition or so to the paragraphs on international law. The President and he worked out the inserts together, and then fell to discussing the afternoon meeting of Republican and Democratic leaders which the President had called as a prelude to the session on the morrow. The idea was to emphasize the non-partisanship of the President's policy, and besides the Congressional chieftains on both sides, Alf Landon and Col. Frank Knox had been invited to attend. Both Hull and the President agreed, however, that the mere holding of the meeting

would be enough. Remembering the unfortunate precedent of the Senate Military Affairs Committee meeting, they planned to avoid fundamental questions of foreign policy, and to limit discussion rather strictly to revision of the Neutrality Act.

As a result, the meeting was decidedly comic. Most of the men invited arrived in expectation of portentous revelations. The first war-time mood had not quite passed, and they were very solemn as they greeted the President and ranged themselves in a semi-circle of chairs around his desk. The solemnity evaporated, however, during the two hours of talk, for when the Republicans found that they had been invited to a conference on legislative strategy, they grew somewhat restive. The House leader, Joe Martin, whispered to Landon at one point, "I'd like to know what we're here for," and both Landon and Colonel Knox were annoyed at having been asked to travel so far to act as mere window-dressing. Indeed, the meeting had only two interesting moments. One came when Garner and Warren Austin, both strong believers in the President's constitutional supremacy over foreign policy, argued as Hull and Davis had, that outright repeal of the whole Neutrality Act ought to be demanded. "If you try that," said Key Pittman to the President, "you'll be damn' lucky to get five votes in my committee." McNary added, with his customary cynicism, "The trouble is that people would think, if we repealed the whole Neutrality Act, that we were repealing our neutrality." The other moment of interest was also occasioned by a remark of Austin's, "If you want my opinion, I think we should indicate our purpose to support the democracies, and legislate with that in mind." To this the President answered,

main issue. Yet somehow, as he spoke, there rose the collective emotion that must inevitably come when the representatives of a great people, even such unpicturesque, shambling, and often ludicrous representatives as the Congress, meet together to decide a fundamental, future-changing question. There was a dead silence, when the President reached his closing words. He was tired by the long effort; he had fumbled one or two sentences, but at the end his voice rang strongly out :

"I should like to be able to offer the hope that the shadow over the world might swiftly pass. I cannot. The facts compel my stating, with candour, that darker periods may lie ahead. The disaster is not of our making; no act of ours engendered the forces which assault the foundations of civilization. Yet we find ourselves affected to the core; our currents of commerce are changing, our minds are filled with new problems, our position in world affairs has already been altered.

"In such circumstances our policy must be to appreciate in the deepest sense the true American interest."

INTO THE FUTURE

THE LONG PROCESS which began in August, 1938, with the Berlin embassy's warning of the onset of the Munich crisis, reached its culmination in September, 1939, with the President's message to the special session. Even in that message, for reasons of political necessity, the President did not bluntly ask the Congress, "Do you or do you not wish to aid the democracies by methods short of war?" Then, as now, the political taboos forbade public frankness; the President and the Congress were oddly forced, as it were, to do good by stealth. Yet there can be no doubt that the principles of international law, the illogicalness of a partial embargo, and the other politely irrelevant arguments of the time were not the real inspiration of the Senators and Representatives in their overwhelming vote for repeal of the arms embargo. There can be no doubt, in truth, that their vote was a strongly affirmative answer to the question the President neglected to ask. And thus aiding the democracies by methods short of war became, at last, after a difficult and anxious evolution, the basis of American policy.

Prophecy is no part of the historian's duty. But after so close a study of the personalities, motives, and incidents forming American policy, it is extremely tempting to forecast the policy-makers' probable

reactions to the three great alternatives the future now holds out. If the policy-makers change, if the mind of the country changes, if any one of a hundred possible new elements enters the situation, the forecasts may prove worthless. It is interesting, however, to set them down.

I

The first alternative is that the democracies will win the war without our active aid. In that case, the theory that neutrals are "parties at interest" in the settlement of a world conflict, first articulated by Sumner Welles in the crisis after Prague, would presumably come into play. Presumably the United States, at the head of a body of lesser neutrals, would claim a seat at the conference table. There we would advocate, as the President continuously advocated in the year from Munich to the outbreak of war, the rather old-fashioned objectives of disarmament and an opening of trade. The best summation of the aim of American policy is the President's often repeated aphorism :

"Only by disarmament and an opening of trade can the world return to common sense."

Long-term political commitments beyond the borders of the Western Hemisphere would be firmly refused at the conference table. On the principle of the distinction between political and economic commitments, laid down in the talks after Munich between the President, Hull, and Welles, there would be no repetition of Woodrow Wilson's errors at Versailles. But on the same principle, economic commitments would be granted, to support the post-war settlement with the strength of our resources. An effort might be made to assure healthy distribution of world raw-

material supplies. The war-weakened nations would probably be re-financed, either by a sharing of the Fort Knox gold hoard or in some other way. Trade barriers would certainly be lowered. Meanwhile, unless the Japanese should force our hands in the interval, England and France would be invited to join in pressing Japan to retire from China. Other, lesser political irritants would also be dealt with. All energy would be concentrated, in fact, on the establishment of a world order politically peaceful and economically stable and productive.

II

Present American policy is obviously a heavy bet on the first alternative. The second is that the war will develop into a prolonged stalemate. In that case, the theory that neutrals are "parties at interest" might be given a war-time application. Fearing the world chaos that would ensue when the greatest and richest nations had fought, quite literally, to a finish, the neutrals might agree to intervene under the leadership of the United States. If the intervention were successful, the result would be a negotiated peace.

A negotiated peace is actually favoured by a minor faction among the American policy-makers, who fear a repetition of the unwise dictated peace of 1919. But such a peace could be achieved only when the warring nations were already nearing the point of exhaustion, and would not be worth much without a change of régime in Germany. Long before neutral intervention could be attempted, the world economy would begin to degenerate dangerously. Consequently the effort to transform the Western Hemisphere into a political and economic unity would meanwhile be desperately

intensified. The hope would be to make the Americas "islands of peace and trade" in a disordered world.

III

The third alternative is that the democracies will be seriously threatened with defeat by the dictatorships. In this war, there is no reason to count on a military victory of England and France, or even on their ability to maintain a stalemate. Should they be on the eve of defeat, the square question would be presented, whether to aid them by methods no longer short of war, using them as our outlying defence posts; or whether to let them be beaten, treble our navy, radically alter our economic system, and meet the ultimate issue between us and the dictatorships bent on dominating the world.

Actually the square question is extremely likely to present itself, at least in economic form. The cash-and-carry provisions of the Neutrality Act require the English and French to pay for American war supplies with their liquid basic assets—their gold, dollar balances, and marketable foreign securities, of which they have only £8,000,000,000 to £10,000,000,000. These assets are also being exhausted by the weakening of sterling and the franc, the necessities of economic warfare, and purchases from other neutrals. While the pool of assets is constantly replenished by newly mined gold and by neutral payments for English and French exports, the outflow is far greater than the inflow. According to English and French estimates conveyed to the State and Treasury Departments, the pool of assets will dry up within two years or two years and a half. We shall

then have to choose between giving the Allies credit, supplies, or gold, and taking the consequences of German victory.

Confronted with such a choice, the present American policy-makers would certainly prefer, if they could, to offer the Allies needed economic aid. Many of them would oppose loans, which could never be repaid and would become trouble-breeders like the First World War debts. But gifts of goods or gold to buy them, made in return for desirable political and economic concessions, would be in a very different category.

Should economic aid be not enough, there is but one useful fragment of solid evidence as to probable policy. What the President said to the War Department men in September, to Frank Murphy in the summer, and to Hull and Welles in the talks after Munich, all adds up to an indication that, if the decision is his, an American expeditionary force will never cross the Atlantic. On the other hand, there is no reason to suppose that his mind would be closed, if the need arose, to assisting the democracies with our Navy and Air Force. He mentioned the possibility in his talk with Murphy. And he has been significantly chary of loose Wilsonian promises, declaring only that an American *army* would not be sent to Europe, and expressing only the *hope* and *belief* that we would remain at peace.

Few men are more deeply sensible than the President of the menace to this country of a world dominated by triumphant dictatorships. Consequently one suspects that in giving his personal answer to the square question, he would choose the more daring part. In this case, however, far more than in any other, the ultimate decision must rest wholly with public opinion.

SUMMING UP

WHEN WE FINISHED the last chapter, the President and his subordinate American policy-makers generally assumed that the future held out only three alternatives. The Allies might win the war. Or a stalemate might develop. Or the prospect of a German victory might force this country to consider giving the Allies more substantial aid.

It may prove a most tragic error that a fourth alternative was neither imagined nor provided against. After the events of the last horrible month it should be clear to everyone that German victory, sweeping and decisive enough to change the whole face of the world we live in, may be at hand *before this country is ready* to increase its aid to the Allies. Indeed, it now seems perfectly possible that in the short interval between the writing of these words and their publication, German victory will be an almost accomplished fact. A fortnight before this book went to press the French were praying to be given the refuse of our arsenals and the most obsolete crates of our Air Force, *merely to keep guns in their men's hands and their planes for a few more weeks in the air.* As this is written the Franco-German armistice has been signed and, though the full implications of that armistice are not yet clear, there can be no doubt that the German

High Command is now preparing its final assault upon the British Isles. The chances of this assault cannot yet be exactly estimated; but there can be no certainty that it will not have succeeded before twelve months have passed. It will take at least that long to organize American and Allied industrial production sufficiently to counter-balance Germany's vast mechanical superiority.

If the worst happens, historians of the future will no doubt regard the failure even to conceive this fourth alternative as the greatest puzzle of our time. Why, they will ask, when in all other respects American foreign policy was as foresighted and effective as circumstances permitted, was not this quite obvious fourth alternative carefully weighed and considered? Why, when Sumner Welles returned from his European mission with the report that Hitler claimed victory by July, was the claim dismissed as preposterous boasting? Why, when the German military leaders were so frank as to the power of their Air Force and the number of their mechanized divisions, were their statements blandly waved aside?

The answer to these questions is to be found not in the failure of any single intelligence, such as the President's, but in a whole complex of circumstances. Lord Baldwin, tossing into the waste-paper basket the British Secret Service's reports on the first stages of German air rearmament, has his place in the complex; so do men like Sir John Simon, Sir Horace Wilson, Georges Bonnet, the incredible Sir Neville Henderson, and in our own country Senator Borah, Senator Nye and Senator Vandenberg. So do obscure minor officials, like the anonymous little ex-officer who has crouched for years in the Bureau of the Budget, wait-

ing to spring on War Department appropriations requests and slice them according to his own peculiar notions of military science. So do the men of the military intelligence, American as well as English and French, whose dazzled admiration for the Nazi system discredited their quite accurate reports of the system's military achievements. So does the apathetic yet suspicious democratic public opinion, which in America would have branded the President a war-monger if he had asked for adequate defence appropriations. And perhaps the largest place must be reserved for the Generals and Admirals of the democratic Armies and Navies, our own included, whose sheer complacency caused them to say: "After all, planes can never capture an objective; you've got to have ground troops for that," and "No army in the world can be so highly mechanized as the Germans claim; it's all nonsense," and "After all, sea power will always win the final decision; look it up in Mahan."

These were incantations, which the democratic military and naval leaders repeated semi-automatically, like so many Tibetan monks droning "*Om mane padme hom*," until they had lulled themselves, their nations' political leaders, and their peoples into a comfortable coma. Like almost all others in their positions, the President and the American policy-makers were hopelessly entangled in this complex of circumstances and ended by partly succumbing to the coma.

But there is no use now worrying about whether this man or that is to blame for our present plight and the plight of the world. The main job, as the suddenly awakened country evidently realizes, is to re-assess the position of the United States in the light of the terrible and previously unimagined fourth

alternative. If Germany wins the war, what ought our first steps to be? How will our interests be affected? And how far may we reasonably expect to be successful in guarding them? These are the questions which the events of the past weeks have put squarely before the American people.

In anticipation of German victory, the first steps have already been taken, in the launching of huge Army and Navy expansion programmes. At present our Navy, though equal to any in the world, is sufficient to hold only one ocean. It is specifically designed, in fact, for the Pacific service. Since the British Navy can no longer be expected to police the Atlantic after a German victory, we need a Navy far greater than the greatest Great Britain ever attempted to support. As yet the President has not asked for appropriations or, so far as is known, made plans even vaguely adequate for our new naval needs. By the most optimistic estimates, the new fleet will require an original capital outlay of \$7,000,000,000, and when built will cost \$2,500,000,000 annually to maintain.

Unfortunately, it will not be enough merely to make the appropriations available for the Navy, although this should not be delayed for an instant. Naval building is an incredibly slow process. It may take as long as eight or ten years to build the fleet up to the new needs, even if the task is immediately embarked on. And thus the greatest present importance attaches to the expansion of the Army, which will have to defend the American hemisphere until the Navy can be built up.

Even more than the Navy, the Army was the victim of years of neglect after the First World War. The President improved and modernized it during the

first years of his administration, but it was never his favourite. It is still smaller and in many respects less well-equipped than the Army of Switzerland, or the Dutch and Belgian Armies which are now no more. Planes, anti-aircraft guns and equipment, tanks, anti-tank guns, mechanization, transport, field-kitchens, blankets, uniforms—all these obvious essentials are sadly lacking. They must be supplied without delay. Even for the Army, the President has shown a strange reluctance to ask all the money that is required. As this is written, some \$750,000,000 in vital regular Army appropriations remains to be requested. Additional vast sums will have to be spent for aeroplanes and tanks. In the end the capital outlay for the Army, exclusive of the air service, is likely to reach \$3,500,000,000. The force of 50,000 planes already called for by the President will cost at least \$5,000,000,000 more at current prices. If the eventual maintenance charges for Air Force and Army combined do not come to \$2,500,000,000 a year, the experts will be pleasantly surprised. And thus the total Army and Navy expenditures now suddenly in prospect are the almost incredible sums of \$15,500,000,000 for new equipment and \$5,000,000,000 annually for maintenance.

Finding such sums for national defence will call for great self-denial by the American people, and perhaps ultimately for a fundamental reorganization of our economy. Yet if Germany wins, we cannot hesitate. Estimates of what Hitler has spent on his military machine in the last five years range up to \$100,000,000,000 in terms of American purchasing power; and while the translation into dollars may be dubious, it is positive and unquestioned

least 25 per cent and probably 40 per cent of the German nation's entire productive capacity has been harnessed for war purposes. Because of our fortunate strategic position we do not have to equal the German effort. For example, we do not require a tank force as great as Germany's so long as we can feel fairly confident of preventing large numbers of German tanks from being landed to attack us. What we do need, however, we must pay for willingly. The penalty of refusing to pay is now looming before our eyes, and there are few Americans who will not choose any other conceivable alternative.

Nor can we stop at putting our hands deep in our pockets. Besides equipment, the Army is sadly lacking in men. A standing force of 280,000, plus a half-trained National Guard of about the same size, is not enough to do the job the Army may be called on to do. The standing force will have to be increased, probably to about 750,000 men. In order to provide an immediately mobilizable reserve of 2,500,000, a system of selective compulsory service will also have to be introduced, by which the best of each year's class of young men will receive three months of intensive summer training for three summers running. In truth, we shall have to become a semi-militarized nation for the first time in our history. The sooner we face this necessity, the better it will be for us. The lesson of the European tragedy is that no democracy can prepare itself without going on a war-time basis. We should do so at once.

Lest this programme for national defence seems somewhat alarmist, the extent of land and sea which the United States is bound to defend should be kept constantly in mind. Beginning in the Pacific the

actual commitments of the United States include the Philippines, which are American territory until 1946; Hawaii and a number of other Pacific islands; Alaska; the Dominion of Canada, which the President specifically guaranteed from foreign attack; the entire continent of South America, where the Monroe Doctrine operates, and several colonial possessions in this hemisphere, such as Bermuda and the British Caribbean islands. Furthermore, while they are not covered by definite commitments, our own security binds us to prevent Greenland, Iceland, the Azores, the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands from becoming potential bases of powerful hostile nations, and at the other end of the world to guard the vital trade route which brings us rubber and tin from the Malay States.

Presuming an early and decisive German victory, our ability to perform this tremendous defensive task will depend upon two factors: the fate of the Allied Navies, and the intentions of Japan. If Germany wins, we shall probably attempt at once to make a Munich in the Far East. If Japan cannot be appeased there is little hope of guarding all that we ought to guard unless a substantial part of the Allied Navies takes refuge on this side of the Atlantic. This is almost too much to expect, and while we may still pray for the best, we ought to prepare for the worst. The worst may assume two broad shapes.

1. German victory, accompanied by the formation of an active German-Italian-Japanese alliance against us, but preceded by the destruction of most of the Allied Navies. In this case, we shall simply have to contract our defence lines. The Malayan trade route will have to be abandoned, which will call for nationalization of rubber supplies, the establishment of buna

plants, and the building of refineries to smelt Bolivian tin. The Philippines and the British possessions in the far Pacific will have to be resigned to their fate. The fleet will have to withdraw to its Hawaiian base, and a large part of it will have to be transferred to the Atlantic to deal with possible trouble in South America. The Azores, Canaries, and Cape Verdes, Iceland, and probably Greenland will have to be allowed to fall into German or Italian hands. In short, we shall have to concentrate on holding the hemisphere alone. To hold the hemisphere, we shall probably have to embark on a policy of modified imperialism, making defensive bases on Newfoundland, in the Northern part of Venezuela and the Island of Trinidad, and in the Natal district of Brazil and the Island of Fernando Noronha. And even if we can base in these strategic positions, holding the hemisphere will be an extremely difficult job until the projected new Air Force is partly in being.

2. German victory, accompanied by the surrender of the Allied fleets as well as by the formation of the German-Italian-Japanese alliance. In this case, the contraction of our defence lines will have to be far more ruthless. It will take the Germans from a year to eighteen months to man the Allied ships, but in so short a period we cannot possibly prepare an adequate hemispheric defence against strong naval attack. In the Pacific, Hawaii and Alaska will have to be abandoned. Since the Japanese can hardly send an effective expeditionary force across such a breadth of ocean to attack our Western coast, virtually all of the Navy will have to be transferred to the Atlantic. The Panama Canal will be in danger of Japanese raids, but the main necessity will be to protect the Caribbean

area and the area of Canadian coast which might become a base for air raids against the munitions industry in New England. All of South America below the Caribbean area will have to go also. A high naval officer recently summed up our problem in such a situation with the remark that "we would have our hands full *defending* the North American continent."

Again, these calculations may seem alarmist but they are based on actual plans now in existence at the War and Navy Departments. Possibly it is true that Germany will be exhausted by the war. Possibly it is true that digesting her European conquests will occupy all of Germany's time, although a somewhat shark-like digestive faculty is suggested by the example of Rotterdam, where a squadron of bombers, flying wing to wing, quartered a square mile of the surrendered city until many thousands of innocent people had been killed and their homes and shops and churches had been reduced to broken shards and smoking ruins. It is patently ridiculous, however, to imagine that Germany has no designs on the American hemisphere. In the first place, even if Hitler conquers all of Europe, he will be in desperate need of raw materials when the war ends, and these he can hope to get promptly and in large quantity only on this side of the Atlantic. And in the second place, the evidence of German designs on our hemisphere is already grimly clear.

In the past months fifth column activity throughout Central and South America has been amazingly intensified. Besides uncounted under-cover agents, the German legation in Mexico and the German embassies in Brazil and Argentina are each staffed with at least

It is hoped that these expeditions, being authorized under the Lima Declaration, will not bear the stigma of Yankee imperialism which used to attach to the old sendings of marines; but whatever may be thought of them, the expeditions will be sent. And unless the Germans have obtained the Allied fleets the expeditions ought to accomplish their objective.

This will solve only part of the problem, however. After the fifth columnists have been driven out and truly national governments restored, answers will still have to be found to fundamental economic questions. The economies of all the South American nations and most of the nations of Central America are dependent upon Europe. It will do no good to suppress German political encroachment in this hemisphere if we allow economic penetration to continue unhindered. Yet we cannot take the South American raw materials which have always gone abroad, for they are largely competitive with our own.

In the plan prepared by the State Department to meet this contingency one can see, perhaps better than anywhere else, the appalling difficulties which a German victory will impose on us. The plan is to induce all the nations of the Americas to join a vast commercial co-operative managed from Washington, by which the produce of the hemisphere will be traded for the produce of a Europe whose commerce will be managed from Berlin. The plan is grandiose to the point of impracticality. It calls for unheard of sacrifices by groups which have always wielded great political power in this country, since the Argentine, for example, can hardly be expected to join such a co-operative if the wheat and meat producers of the United States continue to compete for the export

market. If the initial obstacles are got over the plan will be fantastically complex in operation. Yet so far as is known it is the only plan in existence to deal with a situation extremely likely to arise, and quite certain if it arises to affect our vital interests in the most direct manner possible.

A vast and immensely costly rearmament, years of danger if not of actual war, a constant and perhaps losing struggle to prevent important areas of the Americas from falling under foreign domination—these do not make a pleasant prospect. But there is no use blinking the fact. No prospect will be pleasant for the United States after a decisive German victory in Europe.

To prevent such a victory was always the intention of the President, who envisioned more clearly than most men what it would mean. Unfortunately, we have not the *matériel*, or the factories, or even the men to turn the tide now in the fields of France. What we can do, we ought to do. Food, money, volunteers, even a few kinds of military supplies of which we have a surplus, should be made immediately available to the Allies. For the rest, we must simply await the outcome of the fighting, and concentrate all our energy in the effort to aid the Allies later if they can hold out. If they cannot hold out, what we had planned for their aid will be needed for our own defence.

Nor must we suppose, if by good luck and a tremendous effort we achieve preparedness in time, that our troubles will end there. The effort itself, although it may be accompanied by a temporary armaments boom, will eventually tend to disorganize our economy. The consequences of German conquest in the rest of

the world will almost certainly make the disorganization complete. Both this economic disorganization and the character of the effort required of us are bound to affect our constitutional system, in which power and responsibility are now so divided and re-divided that planned national action on a broad front is always extremely difficult. Both politically and economically the United States is likely to change beyond recognition.

But for the philosopher, if not for the traditionalist, there is one trifling consolation in the terrible stresses and changes which may be ahead. The unification of a nation releases an extraordinary dynamic energy. After France was unified by Richelieu all Europe had to go to war against France every thirty years or so, until France's energy was finally exhausted in the great campaigns of Napoleon. An even greater energy was produced by the unification of Germany in the nineteenth century, from one aftermath of which the world is now tragically suffering. And as the Napoleonic campaigns ended by uniting Germany, so a German victory will surely end by uniting the only outwardly United States. Hitherto, we have suffered from sectionalism, from lack of homogeneity, from the inability of our people to think in bold national terms. But when we are truly united the release of dynamic energy will follow. Considering the great size of our country and its incomparable wealth in resources both human and material, it is stirring to try to imagine what may happen then.

APPENDIX I

UP TO NOW

TO DESCRIBE the formative period of American foreign policy, to record the disappointments and successes, and to suggest the policy's future implications, were the announced purposes of this history. They have now been accomplished. But since recent events are in every man's mind, there may be a place for less detailed survey of the developments subsequent to the outbreak of war.

The policy-makers themselves have not changed much since September 1939. The President, as always, is the entrepreneur of American policy. He retains the power of final decision, originates the main moves, and supervises their execution. And Cordell Hull, as always, is second in command, more conservative in method than the President, but of the same mind on all basic questions. His influence is often underestimated, for he cares little for public credit, and is content to delegate many conspicuous tasks. The mere fact, however, that "an opening of trade" remains one of the major objectives of American policy is sufficient testimony to Hull's influence. The objective was established on Hull's insistence, despite the jeering of the Moleys, the Pecks, and the Tugwells, at the beginning of the New Deal. Hull's thinking now more than ever colours the international opinions of the President and the men around him.

It would be Pollyanna-ish to pretend that the

policy-makers are invariably a happy family. Sumner Welles sees the President as frequently as Hull, perhaps better understands how to talk to him, and wields a special power in special fields, such as that of South American affairs. Welles has sometimes seemed to challenge Hull's supremacy, with the inevitable results. Adolph Berle, the drafting officer and idea man, manages to remain close to both Hull and Welles despite their occasional differences. But elsewhere in the Department, even among the career officers who serve as experts and technicians, men seem to be compelled to choose sides between the two highest officials. Then, too, most of the policy-makers have their faults. The President is over-hasty. Hull is over-deliberate. Welles and Berle tend to require Hull's experienced shrewdness to reduce their bold plans to practical dimensions, while the career men tend to be too easily distressed by departures from the conventional. Yet, taking them as a group, the policy-makers work well together.

The policy-makers have not changed. Nor have the main lines of the policy they developed during the year from Munich to the outbreak of the war. But the war itself, so long expected, has now become the central fact to which all others are somehow related.

In the Western Hemisphere, for example, the two aims are to present a hemispheric front to war-time problems, and to achieve a hemispheric unity which will serve to insulate the Americas, so far as possible, against the shocks of post-war chaos. The programme outlined by the President and Welles was accepted virtually *in toto* at the Panama Conference in September, after the usual minor delays by the Argentinians. While the hemispheric neutrality zone has not proved its usefulness to date, the other features of the hemispheric war-time front have already survived several tests.

Through the Inter-American Neutrality Committee sitting at Rio, and by direct consultation with one another, the nations of the Americas are acting together with considerable effect.

In its more important aspect, however, the Roosevelt-Welles programme remains to be tested. The theory is excellent. Since the basis of hemispheric unity must be economic, it is desired to strengthen the trade ties between the Northern and Southern continents. The task is immensely complex, since every discussion of inter-American trade is hag-ridden by the nightmarish problem of the defaulted South American bonds, and by the harsh fact that so many South American products are competitive with ours. The solution proposed is a modified economic imperialism, by which public and private resources in this country will be mobilized to finance South American production of complementary raw materials, such as rubber and quinine, which we can take in exchange for our manufactured goods. Successfully put in practice, this theory might result in a most desirable hemispheric self-containment. But while an Inter-American Economic Committee has been convened in Washington, and certain steps have been taken, such as the establishment of an Inter-American Bank, no apparatus adequate for the required long-term planning has yet been devised. Sumner Welles, Henry Morgenthau, and the chief men in the Commerce Department have been trying to do the work in their spare time, with interminable bureaucratic bickering as the most conspicuous result. Better things are not to be hoped for until the President is willing to confide the planning job to a small number of competent, enthusiastic men who will have no other pre-occupations.

Insulation against post-war shocks is the goal of hemispheric policy; the goal of Far Eastern policy is to prevent the Japanese from entrenching themselves

in China until the English and French are free to join in teaching them their place. Heretofore Far Eastern problems have been touched on only incidentally; they require no further mention here except to explain briefly the puzzle of the much-discussed embargo. The termination of the Japanese commercial treaty became effective in January, and this country may now use at will the weapon of an embargo on Japanese trade. With the war closing other markets and sources of raw materials to the Japanese, use of it would probably be fatal to them. Yet it would also be likely to spread turmoil through the Far East, since the desperate Japanese leaders might be expected to seize the Netherlands East Indies and probably the Philippines as soon as the embargo was proclaimed. Japan is already showing signs of severe exhaustion. And since the embargo is not yet necessary and would be so provocative, the policy-makers are content to keep their biggest weapon in reserve.

On the whole it is much more surprising that the outbreak of war should have had repercussions in European policy than in hemispheric or Far Eastern policy. The expectation of war dominated the thoughts of the policy-makers for a whole year before war came. One might suppose that the coming of war would have brought no change. It is nevertheless true that since the war the President has placed an increasing emphasis on peace-making, which was not necessarily a part of his previous plans. Peace-making has, indeed, been the subject of a serious controversy within the policy-making group. A cautious faction has urged that premature appearances in the role of peace-maker will detract from our later effectiveness. More daring advisers have argued that to talk peace, peace, peace until peace comes will give this country the useful character of the voice of common sense. The President signified his acceptance of the latter

view in December, when he appointed Myron Taylor special ambassador to the Vatican.

A typical result of this new emphasis on peace-making was Sumner Welles' European mission. The Welles mission was announced as an expedition to seek information. Since William Phillips in Rome has no access to Mussolini and the chargé, Alexander Kirk, in Berlin, sees neither Hitler nor Von Ribbentrop, seeking information was undoubtedly one motive. Equally undoubtedly, however, another motive was to try to seize upon what appeared to be a one-in-a-hundred chance of reasonable peace-making.

This was subsequently denied, when peace-making began to seem wildly impractical, but as usual the circumstances of the time must be the real test. Throughout the winter the President and the State Department had been besieged by persons pleading for intervention in behalf of peace before the war entered a more violent phase. Business men with foreign connections, like Thomas Watson of International Business Machines, and James Mooney of the General Motors Export Corporation, were fertile in splendid schemes, in most of which appointment of the business men themselves as secret emissaries figured largely. Appeasement-minded foreign visitors, like the Swedish capitalist, Axel Wennergren, energetically argued that it was not too late to intervene. Habitual Mr. Fixits, like Oswald Garrison Villard, returned from Europe to report that intervention might still get results.

At the same time the European cables brought numberless predictions of spring offensives, which would make the war a finish fight. In January the predictions rose to a shrill crescendo of anxiety and alarm, yet it was also reported that a powerful element in the Nazi high command was bitterly disappointed with the failure of the German gamble on peace after

victory in Poland. Two abortive mobilizations for invasion of the Low Countries suggested that Hitler's more conservative advisers were extremely reluctant to give the signal for final catastrophe. Under these circumstances, it was not entirely unexpected that the President, always optimistic, should see an off-chance for an acceptable peace. At first he played with the notion, mentioning it to men close to him. After talking with Bernard Baruch, he even considered naming as his emissary President Isaiah Bowman of Johns Hopkins University, the great geographer who drew many of the boundaries in the Versailles Treaty. Then, late in January, he began more serious discussions with Cordell Hull.

Their point of departure was the theory that "neutrals are parties at interest in a modern war." They first proposed to form a neutral front for peace. Both Hull and the President fully realized, however, that the chance of peace was very slim, and they were aware that if their bet went wrong they might find themselves involved in discussions with other neutrals of such embarrassing topics as the British blockade. Consequently they did not abandon the project of a neutral front, but decided to limit its scope, by excluding war-time problems, to consideration of neutral interests in the post-war settlement. This decision meant that if immediate intervention was to be attempted, some sort of special mission would have to be sent to Europe. They were considering the names of candidates for the mission when Welles returned from a Southern vacation on February 1.

What followed is slightly mysterious, but three important facts may be clearly discerned. First, the President took up with Welles where he had left off with Hull. Welles, who has a fondness for formal diplomatic negotiation, showed himself enthusiastically ready to undertake the special mission. Second, the

President was inclined to choose someone like Welles, since his experience in the Wilson administration implanted in him a distaste for such secret envoys as Colonel House. And third, from February 1 to February 7, the predictions in the cables grew continuously more ominous, until it suddenly seemed as though the time to intervene might pass before long. Accordingly the President, acting on one of his hunches, suddenly made up his mind to name Welles. He then informed Hull, who had to take Welles' appointment as a *fait accompli*.

of disarmament and an opening of trade. If the situation warranted, in fact, he was authorized to renew the offer of the President's message to Hitler and Mussolini of April 1939. It will be recalled that this offer was to join in a disarmament conference, and to support an economic settlement with the resources of the United States, if the European nations would arrange a satisfactory political settlement among themselves. Unhappily, the pre-requisite of a satisfactory political settlement was that Germany should disgorge her war gains and accede to a new ordering of Europe giving reasonable guarantees against aggression. The rewards offered for so doing were only disarmament and an opening of trade. And to offer such rewards to Germany, a great military autarchy, was rather like peddling Bibles in a brothel.

As might have been anticipated, Welles' function became almost wholly reportorial. Furthermore, judging by the apparent results of Welles' mere presence in Europe, the plan of talking peace, peace, peace until peace finally comes is not entirely well-advised. It must be repeated, however, that this plan represents only a change of emphasis, rather than a change in fundamental direction. Indeed the very nature of Welles' authorization demonstrated that the principles of policy touching the Second World War have not materially changed since they were first laid down. These principles may be re-summarized as follows.

1. "Only by disarmament and an opening of trade can the world return to common sense."¹
2. "Neutrals are parties at interest in a modern war, and particularly in the post-war settlement."²
They therefore have the right to intervene, at an

¹ The President's aphorism

² Welles speaking after Prague.

appropriate time, in behalf of a world return to common sense.

3. While no political commitments may be made outside the Western Hemisphere, economic commitments, looking towards a stable world economy, are both permissible and necessary. These economic commitments, which may entail considerable short-term sacrifices by the United States and other neutrals, will be the belligerents' reward for accepting the neutrals' intervention.
4. Since victorious dictatorships would not conceivably join in disarmament and an opening of trade, the democracies are to be aided by "methods short of war."
5. "Whatever happens, we won't send troops abroad."¹ But this appears to be the only definite limitation on the kinds of aid for the democracies which "methods short of war" can be stretched to include, -

Possible applications of these principles have already been suggested, in the short chapter on the future. Nor need much more be said of the present. The surface signs are somewhat disheartening. Out of petty controversies on such subjects as the blockade, censorship, and war-buying, considerable anti-Allied feeling has arisen. Many people have actually achieved a point of view from which it does not seem insane to complain at the Allies' unwillingness to spend their basic assets on American tobacco and canned fruit. Observing this state of affairs on vacation here during the winter lull abroad, William Bullitt angrily remarked: "This country is still in the mood of England before Munich."

¹ The President talking to the War Department men after the outbreak of war.

To a great extent, unquestionably, Bullitt was right. Vast numbers of Americans are doing their best to ignore the unpleasant implications of the Second World War, just as the English anxiously tried to avert their eyes from the unpleasant implications of the rise of Hitler. Micawberism is still the prevailing mental habit. The prospects are too appalling, too sternly difficult to face, and we do not face them. There is not the least sign of any general grasp of the overwhelming probability that after the war, unless we act wisely and decisively, we shall find ourselves in a world at best economically and politically prostrate, and at worst dominated by systems of politics and economics violently incompatible with our own. The choice probably confronting us is fairly clear. Either we can accept the responsibility, on which grave risks certainly attend, to use our power and resources to make the world a decent place to live in. Or we can run the even graver risk of being ultimately forced to retire from the world, and to sacrifice our freedoms to the centralized controls of a closed economy. Yet not one voice is raised in national debate on this great choice.

On the other hand, Bullitt's angry remark omitted two important factors. One is suggested by the remark itself. If the country is still in the mood of the English before Munich, it may be only because, like the English, we are afflicted by the unhappy slowness which is the price of our democratic freedoms. Like the European democracies, when the issues of the war are brought more closely home to us, we may be expected to respond in the manner best calculated to safeguard our interests. The other factor of importance is the difference between the American and English leadership. Neville Chamberlain did not lead the English people to war. He was far more guilty of Micawberism than the Englishman in the street, who

had, in the end, to drive his government to act. The Roosevelt administration may end next January, but while the President is still in office, he and his fellow policy-makers will continue almost to drag the people along behind them.

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APPENDIX II

DOCUMENTATION

SINCE EVEN THE best official style is frequently Delphic and rarely stirring, we have not burdened our story of the formative period of American foreign policy with long quotations from the relevant public documents. Instead, we have preferred to summarize what the documents said. For a close student, however, the texts are most illuminating, both in their statements and their omissions. While they are too repetitious to require unedited presentation, it will be useful to append significant passages from them, with some notes on their origination.

For a starter, we choose one of those general statements of principle which were so characteristic of the earlier manner of American diplomacy. This one, important because it summarizes the viewpoint from which the American policy-makers still judge foreign affairs, was delivered when the world atmosphere first began to be surcharged with menace of a general war. Italy was already in Ethiopia. The Civil War in Spain had already broken out. The Rhineland had been re-occupied. And only a few days before, the celebrated Marco Polo bridge incident had initiated the Japanese onslaught on the independence of all China. The beginning of the Sino-Japanese war was, in fact, the statement's *raison d'être* :

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF STATE CORDELL HULL,
JULY 16, 1937

This country constantly and consistently advocates maintenance of peace. We advocate national and international self-restraint. We advocate abstinence by all nations from use of force in pursuit of policy and from interference in the internal affairs of other nations. We advocate adjustment of problems in international relations by processes of peaceful negotiation and agreement. We advocate faithful observance of international agreements. Upholding the principle of the sanctity of treaties, we believe in modification of provisions of treaties, when need therefor arises, by orderly processes carried out in a spirit of mutual helpfulness and accommodation.

We believe in respect by all nations for the rights of others and performance by all nations of established obligations. We stand for revitalizing and strengthening of international law.

We advocate steps toward promotion of economic security and stability the world over. We advocate lowering or removing of excessive barriers in international trade. We seek effective equality of commercial opportunity and we urge upon all nations application of the principle of equality of treatment. We believe in limitation and reduction of armament. Realizing the necessity for maintaining armed forces adequate for national security, we are prepared to reduce or to increase our own armed forces in proportion to reductions or increases made by other countries.

We avoid entering into alliances or entangling commitments but we believe in co-operative effort by peaceful and practicable means in support of the principles hereinbefore stated.

A few months later, the same causes, working on the more active mind of the President, produced the first really controversial administration utterance on foreign policy. Although, like the Hull statement, it precedes our formative period, it is worth quoting at some length.

ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT AT THE CEREMONIES MARKING
THE DEDICATION OF THE OUTERLINK BRIDGE OVER THE
MOUTH OF THE CHICAGO RIVER, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS,
OCTOBER 5, 1937

As the responsible executive head of the Nation, I have chosen this great inland city and this gala occasion to speak to you on a subject of definite national importance.

The political situation in the world, which of late has been growing progressively worse, is such as to cause grave concern and anxiety to all the peoples and nations who wish to live in peace and amity with their neighbours. . . .

The present reign of terror and international lawlessness began a few years ago. -

It began through unjustified interference in the internal affairs of other nations or the invasion of alien territory in violation of treaties, and has now reached a stage where the very foundations of civilization are seriously threatened. The landmarks and traditions which have marked the progress of civilization towards a condition of law, order, and justice are being wiped away . . .

Innocent peoples and nations are being cruelly sacrificed to a greed for power and supremacy which is devoid of all sense of justice and humane consideration.

To paraphrase a recent author, "perhaps we foresee a time when men, exultant in the technique of homicide, will rage so hotly over the world that every precious thing will be in danger, every book and picture harmony, every treasure garnered through two millenniums, the small, the delicate, the defenceless—all will be lost or wrecked or utterly destroyed."

If those things come to pass in other parts of the world, let no one imagine that America will escape, that it may expect mercy, that this Western Hemisphere will not be attacked and that it will continue tranquilly and peacefully to carry on the ethics and the arts of civilization.

If those days come "there will be no safety by arms, no help from authority, no answer in science. The storm will rage till every flower of culture is trampled and all human beings are levelled in a vast chaos."

If those days are not to come to pass—if we are to have a

world in which we can breathe freely and live in amity without fear—the peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort to uphold laws and principles on which alone peace can rest secure.

The peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort in opposition to those violations of treaties and those ignorings of humane instincts which to-day are creating a state of international anarchy and instability from which there is no escape through mere isolation or neutrality.

Those who cherish their freedom and recognize and respect the equal right of their neighbours to be free and live in peace, must work together for the triumph of law and moral principles in order that peace, justice, and confidence may prevail in the world . . .

There is a solidarity and interdependence about the modern world, both technically and morally, which makes it impossible for any nation completely to isolate itself from economic and political upheavals in the rest of the world . . . International anarchy destroys every foundation for peace. It is, therefore, a matter of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States that the sanctity of international treaties and the maintenance of international morality be restored . . .

I am compelled and you are compelled, to look ahead. The peace, the freedom and the security of ninety per cent of the population of the world is being jeopardized by the remaining ten per cent who are threatening a breakdown of all international order and law. Surely the ninety per cent who want to live in peace under law and in accordance with moral standards that have received almost universal acceptance through the centuries, can and must find some way to make their will prevail.

The situation is definitely of universal concern. The questions involved relate not merely to violations of specific provisions of particular treaties . . . They also involve problems of world economy, world security, and world humanity.

It is true that the moral consciousness of the world must recognize the importance of removing injustices and well-founded grievances; but at the same time it must be aroused to the cardinal necessity of honouring

of treaties, of respecting the rights and liberties of others and of putting an end to acts of international aggression.

It seems to be unfortunately true that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.

When an epidemic of physical disease starts to spread, the community approves and joins in a quarantine of the patients in order to protect the health of the community against the spread of the disease . . .

War is a contagion, whether it be declared or undeclared. It can engulf states and peoples remote from the original scene of hostilities. We are determined to keep out of war, yet we cannot insure ourselves against the disastrous effects of war and the dangers of involvement. We are adopting such measures as will minimize our risk of involvement, but we cannot have complete protection in a world of disorder in which confidence and security have broken down.

If civilization is to survive the principles of the Prince of Peace must be restored. Shattered trust between nations must be revived.

Most important of all, the will for peace on the part of peace-loving nations must express itself to the end that nations that may be tempted to violate their agreements and the rights of others will desist from such a cause. There must be positive endeavours to preserve peace.

America hates war. America hopes for peace. Therefore, America actively engages in the search for peace.

Such was the substance of the President's famous "quarantine" speech at Chicago, which so clearly indicated his opinion of this country's proper role in world affairs. The difference from the Hull statement is startling. The statement, marked throughout by Hull's peculiar style, was as abstract and meditative as Hull himself. The speech was full of theory, but was most striking in its hint of positive action to come. After deciding to speak his mind, the President radically revised the original speech he had agreed on with the State Department. The revisions, made *en route* on the President's trans-continental trip, came as a surprise

to the Department, and troubled the more cautious officials

The scheme the President had in mind in the Chicago speech was the same scheme for quarantining the aggressors which he wished to propose, but found impracticable, in the October after Munich. As previously noted, this scheme was to define an aggressor as any nation sending troops on to the soil of another, and to obtain from all nations a guarantee of absolute non intercourse with aggressors as thus defined. The scheme was tantamount to a plan for American participation in an extreme form of sanctions. And while the nature of his scheme was not clearly revealed in the President's words, his strong tone was enough to cause paroxysms of alarm all over the country. At that time, the vast majority of the people still believed the ostrich provided the perfect model of American diplomacy, and even the President's assertion of the "solidarity and interdependence of the modern world" was therefore considered most upsetting. The reaction was so violent that the President and the other policy-makers hastily changed their tack, repressing every impulse to speak except in platitudes.

After the quarantine speech, almost a year passed before foreign policy produced another document of comparable importance. Such a document, however, appeared on August 18, 1938, when the President interrupted his summer cruise to accept a degree from Queen's University, at Kingston, Ontario. This speech, made on the eve of Munich, was prepared by the President before he left Washington for his vacation, after consulting with Welles and Berle. It contained the important declaration that the United States would tolerate no invasion of the soil of this hemisphere. The declaration took the form of a promise that this country would come to Canada's aid if "any other empire" attempted to seize the neighbouring British Dominion.

ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT AT QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY,
KINGSTON, ONTARIO, CANADA, AUGUST 18, 1938

Civilization is not national—it is international—even though that observation—trite to most of us, is to-day challenged in some parts of the world. Ideas are not limited by territorial borders; they are the common inheritance of all free people. Thought is not anchored in any land; and the profit of education redounds to the equal benefit of the whole world. That is one form of free trade to which the leaders of every opposing political party can subscribe.

In a large sense we in the Americas stand charged to-day with the maintaining of that tradition . . .

A few days ago a whisper, fortunately untrue, raced round the world that armies standing over against each other in unhappy array were to be set in motion. In a few short hours the effect of that whisper had been registered in Montreal and New York, in Ottawa and in Washington, in Toronto and in Chicago, in Vancouver and in San Francisco. Your business men and ours felt it alike; your farmers and ours heard it alike; your young men and ours wondered what effect this might have on their lives.

We in the Americas are no longer a far-away continent, to which the eddies of controversies beyond the seas could bring no interest or no harm. Instead, we in the Americas have become a consideration to every propaganda office and to every general staff beyond the seas. The vast amount of our resources, the vigour of our commerce, and the strength of our men have made us vital factors in the world peace whether we choose or not.

Happily, you and we, in friendship and in entire understanding, can look clear-eyed at these possibilities, resolving to leave no pathway unexplored and no technique undeveloped which may, if our hopes are realized, contribute to the peace of the world. Even if those hopes are disappointed, we can assure each other that this hemisphere at least shall remain a strong citadel wherein civilization can flourish unimpaired.

The Dominion of Canada is part of the sisterhood of the British Empire. I give to you assurance that the people of

the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire .

This statement forecast the hemisphere neutrality zone that American policy-makers announced a year later and at the same time indicated that the President was not disposed to view with indifference a possible German attack on British possessions in the New World. But, apart from this one statement, self-restriction persisted, as we have seen, throughout the Munich crisis. It is interesting to read the President's first Munich message, pleading with Hitler, Benes, Daladier, and Chamberlain not to break off negotiations, in the light of the precedent draft by Adolph Berle and Pierrepont Moffat. As previously stated, this draft was addressed not to the European leaders but to "the American people and all peoples interested." It was planned, in fact, as a sort of eloquent address to the world, in which the President described the horrors of war, and boldly promised to accept if "asked by the parties in interest to offer my good offices to help them work out a settlement." The seemingly irrelevant paragraph in the final version—"The United States has no political entanglements. It is caught in no mesh of hatred. Elements of all Europe had formed its civilization"—was actually a remnant of a sort of preamble to the offer of good offices, in which reasonable impartiality was claimed. The text of the final message reveals how severely the first version was toned down.

MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT TO HITLER, BENES, DALADIER
AND CHAMBERLAIN, SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1938

The fabric of peace on the continent of Europe, if not throughout the rest of the world, is in immediate danger. The consequences of its rupture are incalculable. Should hostilities break out the lives of millions of men, women,

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children in every country involved will most certainly be lost under circumstances of unspeakable horror

The economic system of every country involved is certain to be shattered. The social structure of every country involved may well be completely wrecked.

The United States has no political entanglements. It is caught in no mesh of hatred. Elements of all Europe have formed its civilization.

The supreme desire of the American people is to live in peace. But in the event of a general war they face the fact that no nation can escape some measure of the consequences of such a world catastrophe.

Whatever may be the differences in the controversies at issue and however difficult of pacific settlement they may be, I am persuaded that there is no problem so difficult or so pressing for solution that it cannot be justly solved by the resort to reason rather than by the resort to force.

During the present crisis the people of the United States and their Government have earnestly hoped that the negotiations for the adjustment of the controversy which has now arisen in Europe might reach a successful conclusion.

So long as these negotiations continue so long will there remain the hope that the world may escape the madness of a new resort to war.

On behalf of the 130 millions of people of the United States of America and for the sake of humanity everywhere I most earnestly appeal to you not to break off negotiations.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The same caution was exemplified in the second Munich message which was addressed only to Hitler. The inter relations of the State Department personalities were exemplified in this message. Berle's draft for it was extremely eloquent, but somewhat out of line with the cautious policy then prevailing. Sumner Welles' draft, more formal in tone, emphasizing the worthlessness of resort to force, argued that an agreement in principle already existed and went on to suggest

that "details still to be determined could be agreed on through a meeting for such purposes of representatives of the nations primarily interested." If he had used either the Welles or the Berle draft, the President would have called a European peace conference. A *précis* prepared by Hull, however, merely renewed the arguments of the previous message. And when the President examined the alternatives, he chose Hull's.

Should you agree to a solution in this peaceful manner I am convinced that hundreds of millions throughout the world would recognize your action as an outstanding historic service to all humanity . . .

The Government of the United States has no political involvements in Europe, and will assume no obligations in the conduct of the present negotiations. Yet in our own right we recognize our responsibilities as a part of a world of neighbours.

The conscience and the impelling desire of the people of my country demand that the voice of their government be raised again and yet again to avert and to avoid war.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

As they were without result, it is not necessary to reproduce the President's and Welles' speeches in October 1938, in which the importance of disarmament was mentioned. As an essential document, however, the Declaration of Lima deserves fuller quotation than we have given it. This first-fruit of the talks after Munich bears the marks of its history—the transmutation of Hull's formula by the Argentine, Cantillo, and the transmutation of Cantillo to please other participants in the Lima conference—in its rather trying style.

DECLARATION OF LIMA, UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED BY EIGHTH
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN STATES AT
LIMA, PERU, DECEMBER 23, 1938

The Eighth International Conference of American States,
Considering :

That the peoples of America have achieved spiritual unity through the similarity of their republican institutions, their unshakable will for peace, their profound sentiment of humanity and tolerance, and through their absolute adherence to the principles of international law, of the equal sovereignty of states and of individual liberty without religious or racial prejudices ;

That on the basis of such principles and will, they seek and defend the peace of the continent and work together in the cause of universal concord ; . . .

Declare :

First. That they reaffirm their continental solidarity and their purpose to collaborate in the maintenance of the principles upon which the said solidarity is based ;

Second. That faithful to the above-mentioned principles and to their absolute sovereignty, they reaffirm their decision to maintain them and to defend against all foreign intervention or activity that may threaten them ;

Third. And in case the peace, security, or territorial integrity of any American Republic is thus threatened by acts of any nature that may impair them, they proclaim their common concern and their determination to make effective their solidarity, co-ordinating their respective sovereign wills by means of the procedure of consultation, established by conventions in force and by declarations of the inter-American conferences, using the measures which in each case the circumstances may make advisable. It is understood that the Governments of the American Republics will act independently in their individual capacity, recognizing fully their juridical equality as sovereign states ;

Fourth. That in order to facilitate the consultations established in this and other American peace instruments, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, when deemed desirable and at the initiative of any one of them, will meet in their several capitals by rotation and without protocolary character. Each government may, under special circumstances or for special reasons, designate a representative as a substitute for its Minister for Foreign Affairs ;

Fifth. This declaration shall be known as the " Declaration of Lima."

Other fruits of the talks after Munich were the peace offensive, which at first produced no extensive documents, and the President's January message on the State of the Union. We have seen how the President wrote the foreign affairs passages of the message himself,

working late on the last nights of the old year with Sumner Welles. As his most complete statement of his theory of foreign relations, the message is worth careful study. The religious note was so prominently struck because the pogroms in Germany were fresh in the President's mind, and because isolationism was strong among certain church groups. The references to hemisphere affairs should be read in the light of the Declaration of Lima. The cautious wording of the passage calling for revision of the Neutrality Act should be particularly noted. And the remarks on "the paramount importance" of time are of interest, showing how the New Deal group, who contributed largely to the other sections of the message, were then using the foreign situation as an argument for their domestic programme.

MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT "ON THE STATE OF THE UNION,"
READ TO THE JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS, JANUARY 4, 1939

In reporting on the state of the nation, I have felt it necessary on previous occasions to advise the Congress of disturbance abroad and of the need of putting our own house in order in the face of storm signals from across the seas. As this Seventy Sixth Congress opens there is need for further warning.

A war which threatened to envelop the world in flames has been averted—but it has become increasingly clear that peace is not assured.

All about us rage undeclared wars—military and economic. All about us grow more deadly armaments—military and economic. All about us are threats of new aggression—military and economic.

Storms from abroad directly challenge three institutions indispensable to Americans, now as always. The first is religion. It is the source of the other two—democracy and international good faith.

Where freedom of religion has been attacked, the attack has come from sources opposed to democracy. Where democracy has been overthrown, the spirit of free worship

has disappeared. And where religion and democracy have vanished, good faith and reason in international affairs have given way to strident ambition and brute force.

An ordering of society which relegates religion, democracy and good faith among nations to the background can find no place within it for the ideals of the Prince of Peace. The United States rejects such an ordering, and retains its ancient faith.

There comes a time in the affairs of men when they must prepare to defend not their homes alone but the tenets of faith and humanity on which their churches, their governments and their very civilization are founded. The defence of religion, of democracy, and of good faith among nations is all the same fight. To save one we must now make up our minds to save all . . .

Fortunate it is, therefore, that in this Western Hemisphere we have, under a common ideal of democratic government, a rich diversity of resources and of peoples functioning together in mutual respect and peace.

That Hemisphere, that peace, and that ideal we propose to do our share in protecting against storms from any quarter. Our people and our resources are pledged to secure that protection. From that determination no American flinches.

This by no means implies that the American Republics disassociate themselves from the nations of other continents — *it does not mean* the Americas against the rest of the world. We as one of the Republics reiterate our willingness to help the cause of world peace. We stand on our historic offer to take counsel with all other nations of the world to the end that aggression among them be terminated, that the race of armaments cease, and that commerce be renewed.

But the world has grown so small and weapons of attack so swift that no nation can be safe in its will to peace so long as any other single powerful nation refuses to settle its grievances at the council table.

For if any government bristling with implements of war insists on policies of force, weapons of defence give the only safety . . .

We have learned that long before any overt military act, aggression begins with preliminaries of propaganda, sub-

sidized penetration, the loosening of ties of goodwill, the stirring of prejudice, and the incitement to disunion.

We have learned that God-fearing democracies of the world which observe the sanctity of treaties and good faith in their dealings with other nations cannot safely be indifferent to international lawlessness anywhere. They cannot forever let pass, without effective protest, acts of aggression against sister nations—acts which automatically undermine all of us.

Obviously they must proceed along practical, peaceful lines. But the mere fact that we rightly decline to intervene with arms to prevent acts of aggression does not mean that we must act as if there were no aggression at all. Words may be futile, but war is not the only means of commanding a decent respect for the opinions of mankind. There are many methods short of war, but stronger and more effective than mere words, of bringing home to aggressor governments the aggregate sentiments of our own people.

At the very least, we can and should avoid any action, or any lack of action, which will encourage, assist, or build up an aggressor. We have learned that when we deliberately try to legislate neutrality, our neutrality laws may operate unevenly and unfairly—may actually give aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim. The instinct of self-preservation should warn us that we ought not to let that happen any more . . .

We have now passed the period of internal conflict in the launching of our programme of social reform. Our full energies may now be released to invigorate the processes of recovery in order to preserve our reforms, and to give every man and woman who wants to work a real job at a living wage.

But time is of paramount importance. The deadline of danger from within and from without is not within our control. The hour-glass may be in the hands of other nations. Our own hour-glass tells us that we are off on a race to make democracy work, so that we may be efficient in peace and therefore secure in self defence . . .

Events abroad have made it increasingly clear to the American people that dangers within are less to be feared than dangers from without. If therefore a solution of this

problem of idle men and idle capital is the price of preserving our liberty, no formless selfish fears can stand in our way.

Once I prophesied that this generation of Americans had a rendezvous with destiny. That prophecy comes true. To us much is given ; more is expected.

This generation will "nobly save or meanly lose the last best hope of earth. . . . The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just—a way which if followed the world will forever applaud and God must forever bless."

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 4, 1939.

Next documents of importance are the statement issued after the fall of Prague by Sumner Welles, and the echoing statement issued by Hull on his return from vacation. It will be remembered that Welles wrote his statement after long consultation with the President and several telephone calls to Hull. Hull prepared his at the President's suggestion, and went over it at the White House before making it public. Both statements are good specimens of the general style of the peace offensive.

the domestic affairs of other nations ; and it has on repeated occasions expressed its condemnation of a policy of military aggression.

It is manifest that acts of wanton lawlessness and of arbitrary force are threatening world peace and the very structure of modern civilization. The imperative need for the observance of the principles advocated by this Government has been clearly demonstrated by the developments which have taken place during the past three days.

STATEMENT BY CORDELL HULL,
MARCH 24, 1939

I have in common with the general public here been profoundly shocked by the recent developments in Europe. They have been of a nature seriously to threaten the peace of the world.

These new evidences of international lawlessness make it all the more clear that never before has the support of all nations for law and order and sound economic relations been more urgently needed than at present. We in this country have striven, particularly during recent years, and we shall continue to strive, to strengthen the threatened structure of world peace by fostering in every possible way the rule of law and the building of sound economic relationships upon which alone peace can rest. Every citizen and every group in this country will, I am sure, co-operate loyally and wholeheartedly in this great and urgent task.

The mounting crisis following the fall of Prague produced the President's "please promise to be good" message to Hitler and Mussolini. This message's story has been rather fully given already, but it is worth noting that in his first listing of the countries which Germany and Italy were to promise not to attack, the President accidentally omitted Russia. Except for the inclusion of Russia, the insertion of a purple passage or so from Berle, and various tonings down and re-phrasings suggested by Hull, Norman Davis, and Welles, the President's original draft was

little altered. Especially interesting is the paragraph committing this country to participate in simultaneous disarmament and economic conferences, and the suggestion of a conference to work out a political settlement. Here the distinction between political and economic commitments, outlined in the talks after Munich, found tangible expression. To this proposal of a series of simultaneous conferences, the President was later to revert when he sent Sumner Welles to Europe to talk peace to the belligerents.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO HITLER AND
MUSSOLINI, APRIL 14, 1939

You realize I am sure that throughout the world hundreds of millions of human beings are living to day in constant fear of a new war or even a series of wars.

The existence of this fear—and the possibility of such a conflict—is of definite concern to the people of the United States for whom I speak, as it must also be to the peoples of the other nations of the entire Western Hemisphere.

Because of the fact that after the acute tension in which the world has been living during the past few weeks there would seem to be at least a momentary relaxation—because no troops are at this moment on the march—this may be an opportune moment for me to send you this message.

On a previous occasion I have addressed you in behalf of the settlement of political, economic, and social problems by peaceful methods and without resort to arms.

But the tide of events seems to have reverted to the threat of arms. If such threats continue, it seems inevitable that much of the world must become involved in common ruin. All the world, victor nations, vanquished nations, and neutral nations will suffer. I refuse to believe that the world is, of necessity, such a prisoner of destiny. On the contrary, it is clear that the leaders of great nations have it in their power to liberate their peoples from the disaster that impends. It is equally clear that in their own minds and in their own hearts the peoples themselves desire that their fears be ended.

You have repeatedly asserted that you and your people have no desire for war. If this is true there need be no war.

It is still clear to me that international problems can be solved at the council table.

It is therefore no answer to the plea for peaceful discussion for one side to plead that unless they receive assurances beforehand that the verdict will be theirs, they will not lay aside their arms. In conference rooms, as in courts, it is necessary that both sides enter upon the discussion in good faith, assuming that substantial justice will accrue to both, and it is customary and necessary that they leave their arms outside the room where they confer.

I am convinced that the cause of world peace would be greatly advanced if the nations of the world were to obtain a frank statement relating to the present and future policy of governments.

Because the United States, as one of the nations of the Western Hemisphere, is not involved in the immediate controversies which have arisen in Europe, I trust that you may be willing to make such a statement of policy to me as the head of a nation far removed from Europe in order that I, acting only with the responsibility and obligation of a friendly intermediary, may communicate such declaration to other nations now apprehensive as to the course which the policy of your Government may take.

Are you willing to give assurance that your armed forces will not attack or invade the territory or possessions of the following independent nations: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, The Netherlands, Belgium, Great Britain and Ireland, France, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Russia, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Iraq, the Arabias, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, and Iran?

Such an assurance clearly must apply not only to the present day but also to a future sufficiently long to give every opportunity to work by peaceful methods for a more permanent peace. I therefore suggest that you construe the word 'future' to apply to a minimum period of

assured non-aggression—ten years at the least—a quarter of a century, if we dare look that far ahead.

If such assurance is given by your Government, I will immediately transmit it to the governments of the nations I have named and I will simultaneously inquire whether, as I am reasonably sure, each of the nations enumerated above will in turn give like assurance for transmission to you.

Reciprocal assurances such as I have outlined will bring to the world an *immediate measure of relief*.

I propose that if it is given, two essential problems shall promptly be discussed in the resulting peaceful surroundings, and in those discussions the Government of the United States will gladly take part.

The discussions which I have in mind relate to the most effective and immediate manner through which the peoples of the world can obtain progressive relief from the crushing burden of armament which is each day bringing them more closely to the brink of economic disaster. Simultaneously the Government of the United States would be prepared to take part in discussions looking towards the most practical manner of opening up avenues of international trade to the end that every nation of the earth may be enabled to buy and sell on equal terms in the world market as well as to possess assurance of obtaining the materials and products of peaceful economic life.

At the same time, those governments other than the United States which are directly interested could undertake such political discussions as they may consider necessary or desirable . . .

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

In the pause ensuing on the message to Hitler and Mussolini came the vain effort to repeal the arms embargo in the regular session. Hull's and the President's struggle was fruitful in documents. First came a letter from Hull to Senator Key Pittman, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Representative Sol Bloom, chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Then, when the repeal

In considering the present proposals for legislation, we must keep in mind that, no matter how much we may wish or may try to disassociate ourselves from world events, we cannot achieve disassociation. The simple fact of our existence as a great nation in a world of nations cannot be denied; and the substance of the legislation adopted in this country inevitably influences not only this country, but also other countries. The problem for us is not whether we shall help any foreign country or any group of foreign countries. Nor is it that of passing judgment upon or interfering in other people's controversies. Rather, it is that of so conducting our affairs and our relations with other peoples, both before and after the outbreak of war elsewhere, that we shall be more, and not less, secure; so that we shall not become parties to controversies; and so that our attitude and actions will encourage other people to avoid, rather than to become engaged in, controversy.

Because of troubled conditions with which we are all familiar, the Congress rightly is now considering the situation which might obtain were a state of war to develop between other nations. In such case the first concern of the United States is its own safety as well as the desire and intent, which all of us resolutely follow, to remain at peace . . .

I believe it is important that the legislation which may be enacted should conform, so far as possible, to traditional concepts of international law adhered to by this Government . . .

If we go in for embargoes on exports, for the purpose of keeping ourselves out of war, the logical thing to do would be to make our embargo all-inclusive. Modern warfare is no longer warfare between armed forces only: it is warfare between nations in every phase of their national life . . . I doubt whether we can help ourselves to keep out of war by an attempt on our part to distinguish between categories of exports. Yet a complete embargo upon all exports would obviously be ruinous to our economic life. It therefore seems clear that we should have no general and automatic embargo inflexibly and rigidly imposed on any class or group of exports . . .

For the reasons heretofore stated, it is my firm conviction

that the arms embargo provision of the existing law should be eliminated.

I furthermore believe that the most effective legislative contribution at this time toward keeping this country out of war, if war occurs, would be made by enacting or re-enacting provisions on lines as follows :

To prohibit American ships, irrespective of what they may be carrying, from entering combat areas ;

To restrict travel by American citizens in combat areas ;

To provide that the export of goods destined for belligerents shall be preceded by transfer of title to the foreign purchaser ;

To continue the existing legislation respecting loans and credits to nations at war ;

To regulate the solicitation and collection in this country of funds for belligerents ;

To continue the National Munitions Control Board and the system of arms export and import licences.

Provisions on the suggested lines would, I think, help to keep this country out of war and facilitate our adherence to a position of neutrality. They would make easier our two-fold task of keeping this country at peace and avoiding imposition of unnecessary and abnormal burdens upon our citizens.

Sincerely yours,

CORDELL HULL.

The final crisis was not long in coming. It produced three documents—the messages to the King of Italy, Hitler, and President Moscicki of Poland. As we have seen, the message to the King of Italy was conceived by the President and Welles before the President left on vacation. As first drafted by Welles and Berle, the message was considerably more stirring, and by implication more critical of the dictatorships, than as finally elaborately revised by the President. There was even something in it of Berle's theory that the peoples might be appealed to over the heads of their

rulers. The messages to Hitler and Moscicki, decided on by the President immediately on his return to Washington, were written by Welles and Berle respectively and, as always when the President has no time to prepare such papers himself, thoroughly edited at the White House. The message to Moscicki had to be guarded, since it was desired to avoid at all costs any appearance of putting pressure on Poland to appease Hitler. It contains an interesting hint that the President was then ready to accept the role of arbitrator of the German-Polish dispute. The message to Hitler, on the other hand, was written with the express purpose of offering to its recipient, for the permanent record, the peaceful alternatives which it was frankly feared he would reject. Thus it was far stronger in tone than the Polish message.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE KING OF ITALY,
AUGUST 23, 1939

Again a crisis in world affairs makes clear the responsibility of heads of nations for the fate of their own people and indeed of humanity itself . . .

It is my belief and that of the American people that Your Majesty and Your Majesty's Government can greatly influence the averting of an outbreak of war. Any general war would cause to suffer all nations whether belligerent or neutral, whether victors or vanquished, and would clearly bring devastation to the peoples and perhaps to the governments of some nations most directly concerned. . . .

Nations have an absolute right to maintain their national independence if they so desire. If that be sound doctrine then it must apply to the weaker nations as well as to the stronger.

Acceptance of this means peace, because fear of aggression ends. The alternative, which means of necessity efforts by the strong to dominate the weak, will lead not only to war, but to long future years of oppression on the part of victors and to rebellion on the part of the vanquished. So history teaches us.

On April fourteenth last I suggested in essence an understanding that no armed forces should attack or invade the territory of any other independent nation, and that, this being assured, discussions be undertaken to seek progressive relief from the burden of armaments and to open avenues of international trade including sources of raw materials necessary to the peaceful economic life of each nation.

I said that in these discussions the United States would gladly take part. And such peaceful conversations would make it wholly possible for governments other than the United States to enter into peaceful discussions of political or territorial problems in which they were directly concerned.

Were it possible for Your Majesty's Government to formulate proposals for a pacific solution of the present crisis along these lines you are assured of the earnest sympathy of the United States.

The Governments of Italy and the United States can to-day advance those ideals of Christianity which of late seem so often to have been obscured.

The unheard voices of countless millions of human beings ask that they shall not be vainly sacrificed again.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT MOSCICKI OF
POLAND, AUGUST 24, 1939

The manifest gravity of the existing crisis imposes an urgent obligation upon all to examine every possible means which might prevent the outbreak of general war.

With this in mind, I feel justified in suggesting that certain possible avenues of solution be considered.

The controversy between the Government of Poland and the Government of the German Reich might be made the subject of direct discussion between the two governments.

Should this prove impossible or not feasible, a second avenue might be that of submission of the issues to arbitration.

A third method might be conciliation through a disinterested third party, in which case it would seem appropriate that the parties avail themselves of the services of one of the traditionally neutral states, or a disinterested Republic of the Western Hemisphere wholly removed from

the area and issues of the present crisis. Should you determine to attempt solution by any of these methods, you are assured of the earnest and complete sympathy of the United States and of its people. During the exploration of these avenues, I appeal to you, as I have likewise appealed to the Government of the German Reich, to agree to refrain from any positive act of hostility.

Both Poland and Germany being sovereign governments, it is understood, of course, that upon resort to any one of the alternatives I suggest, each nation will agree to accord complete respect to the independence and territorial integrity of the other.

It is, I think, well known to you that speaking on behalf of the United States I have exerted and will continue to exert every influence in behalf of peace. The rank and file of the population of every nation, large and small, want peace. They do not seek military conquest. They recognize that disputes, claims, and counter claims will always arise from time to time between nations, but that all such controversies without exception can be solved by peaceful procedure if the will on both sides exists so to do.

I have addressed a communication in similar sense to the Chancellor of the German Reich.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT TO HITLER,
AUGUST 24, 1939

To the message which I sent to you last April I have received no reply, but because of my confident belief that the cause of world peace—which is the cause of humanity itself—rises above all other considerations, I am again addressing myself to you with the hope that the war which impends and the consequent disaster to all peoples everywhere may yet be averted.

I therefore urge with all earnestness—and I am likewise urging the President of the Republic of Poland—that the Governments of Germany and of Poland agree by common accord to refrain from any positive act of hostility for a reasonable and stipulated period, and that they agree likewise by common accord to solve

the controversies which have arisen between them by one of the three following methods: first, by direct negotiation; second, by submission of these controversies to an impartial arbitration in which they can both have confidence; or, third, that they agree to the solution of these controversies through the procedure of conciliation, selecting as conciliator or moderator a national of one of the traditionally neutral states of Europe, or a national of one of the American Republics which are all of them free from any connection with or participation in European political affairs.

Both Poland and Germany being sovereign governments, it is understood, of course, that upon resort to any one of the alternatives I suggest, each nation will agree to accord complete respect to the independence and territorial integrity of the other.

The people of the United States are as one in their opposition to policies of military conquest and domination. They are as one in rejecting the thesis that any ruler, or any people, possess the right to achieve their ends or objectives through the taking of action which will plunge countless millions of people into war and which will bring distress and suffering to every nation of the world, belligerent and neutral, when such ends and objectives, so far as they are just and reasonable, can be satisfied through processes of peaceful negotiation or by resort to judicial arbitration.

I appeal to you in the name of the people of the United States, and I believe in the name of peace-loving men and women everywhere, to agree to the solution of the controversies existing between your Government and that of Poland through the adoption of one of the alternative methods I have proposed. I need hardly reiterate that should the Governments of Germany and of Poland be willing to solve their differences in the peaceful manner suggested, the Government of the United States still stands prepared to contribute its share to the solution of the problems which are endangering world peace in the form set forth in my message of April 14.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

The President's address to the people on the outbreak of war is our next document of importance. Having been intended chiefly to soothe the hysteria of the moment, it should be studied more for what it leaves unsaid than for what it says. The President would have liked to make it the clear statement of the issues in foreign policy which even now he has not attempted. He would have liked to point out that Germany was the aggressor in the world conflict, to remind his audience of the economic and political threats to the United States of a German victory, and to ask them to join with him in taking the appropriate steps to guard our interests. The address was the President's own handiwork virtually throughout; the drafts prepared for his use he hardly examined, yet the urging of the President's advisers importantly influenced him. He went as far as he was willing to go in assuring the country that we would not become involved.

In the light of this history, there is much significance in the fact that the President stopped short at a promise that America's *armies* would not be sent to European fields; much significance also in his refusal to express more than a *hope* and a *belief* that the country would keep out of war. We have already suggested the influence of the President's desire to avoid the fate of Wilson, who will always be remembered as the man who led the country to war only a few months after being re-elected as the man who kept the country out. Also to be noted are the President's reversal of Wilson's plea for neutrality in thought, which he retained against the advice of several of the men around him; his vague hints that Germany was the original aggressor, which he substituted for much more direct statements, and his paragraph preparing for the hemispheric neutrality zone.

RADIO ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT, SUNDAY,
SEPTEMBER 3, 1939

To-night my single duty is to speak to the whole of America . . .

For four long years a succession of actual wars and constant crises have shaken the entire world and have threatened in each case to bring on the gigantic conflict which is to-day unbappily a fact.

It is right that I should recall to your minds the consistent and at times successful efforts to your Government in these crises to throw the full weight of the United States into the cause of peace . . . Some day, though the time may be distant, we can be of even greater help to a crippled humanity.

It is right, too, to point out that the unfortunate events of these recent years have been based on the use of force or the threat of force. And it seems to me clear, even at the outbreak of this great war, that the influence of America should be consistent in seeking for humanity a final peace which will eliminate, as far as it is possible to do so, the continued use of force between nations . . .

You must master at the outset a simple but unalterable fact in modern foreign relations. When peace has been broken anywhere, peace of all countries everywhere is in danger.

It is easy for you and me to shrug our shoulders and say that conflicts taking place thousands of miles from the continental United States, and, indeed, the whole American Hemisphere, do not seriously affect the Americas—and that all the United States has to do is to ignore them and go about our own business. Passionately though we may desire detachment, we are forced to realize that every word that comes through the air, every ship that sails the sea, every battle that is fought does affect the American future.

Let no man or woman thoughtlessly or falsely talk of America sending its armies to European fields. At this moment there is being prepared a proclamation of American neutrality . . .

I cannot prophesy the immediate economic effect of this new war on our nation, but I do say that no American has

the moral right to profiteer at the expense either of his fellow citizens or of the men, women, and children who are living and dying in the midst of war in Europe.

Some things we do know. Most of us in the United States believe in spiritual values. Most of us, regardless of what church we belong to, believe in the spirit of the New Testament—a great teaching which opposes itself to the use of force, of armed force, of marching armies and falling bombs. The overwhelming masses of our people seek peace—peace at home, and the kind of peace in other lands which will not jeopardise peace at home.

We have certain ideas and ideals of national safety and we must act to preserve that safety to-day and to preserve the safety of our children in future years.

That safety is and will be bound up with the safety of the Western Hemisphere and of the seas adjacent thereto. We seek to keep war from our firesides by keeping war from coming to the Americas. For that we have historic precedent that goes back to the days of the Administration of President George Washington. It is serious enough and tragic enough to every American family in every State in the Union to live in a world that is torn by wars on other Continents. To-day they affect every American home. It is our national duty to use every effort to keep them out of the Americas.

And at this time let me make the simple plea that partisanship and selfishness be adjourned; and that national unity be the thought that underlies all others.

This nation will remain a neutral nation, but I cannot ask that every American remain neutral in thought as well. Even a neutral has a right to take account of facts. Even a neutral cannot be asked to close his mind or his conscience.

I have said not once but many times that I have seen war and that I hate war. I say that again and again.

I hope the United States will keep out of this war. I believe that it will. And I give you assurances that every effort of your Government will be directed toward that end.

As long as it remains within my power to prevent, there will be no blackout of peace in the United States.

And here our array of documents comes to an end. There was one more public paper in the period of our history—the President's message to the special session urging repeal of the arms embargo. But this, by the odd chances of politics, was by far the least meaningful of all the documents of the time. The arguments presented were not the arguments of high policy. The intimations of the message of January 4, that this country had a vital interest in the world conflict, were only repeated in quotations. What everyone knew to be the real reason for repeal of the arms embargo was not directly mentioned. Instead, the President's arguments were that the embargo was inconsistent with international law, inherently un-neutral because it helped one side and hurt the other, and more likely in the long run to get us into war than keep us out. Since these arguments are already to be found in Secretary Hull's letter to Senator Pittman and Representative Bloom and since every other significant statement of the President's had been made already in the message of January 4, there seems to be no reason why the message to the special session should be reproduced here.

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